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 Kersey 1 
Introduction 
 
Foreign aid in the United States was born at the end of World War II with two 
purposes in mind: European recovery and the creation of strong economic ties between 
the United States and the Western world.  However, as soon as the 1950s, foreign aid 
evolved into a foreign policy tool primarily used to provide security for the recipient state 
and the United States’ own global interests (Hastedt 2003, 349).  Though the perceived 
uses of foreign aid would continue to grow and change over the next fifty years to include 
the encouragement of economic development, the connection between foreign aid and the 
United States’ national security would continue to be the primary force driving the 
United States’ foreign aid policy.   
The connection between the United States’ foreign assistance policy and the real 
and perceived security threats facing the United States in the second half of the 20th 
century is evident in the language used to discuss foreign aid in the United States, the 
development of the United States’ foreign assistance bureaucracy, and the 
correspondence between fluctuations in the amount of aid distributed and important 
historical events.  Though an examination of these facets of the United States’ aid 
distribution policies illuminates the connection between foreign aid and security in the 
United States, it does little to demonstrate the effects these distribution policies have on 
recipient states.  In order to demonstrate these effects more clearly it is necessary to study 
U.S. aid policy towards specific recipient countries and the effects these policies have 
had on them.  However, the sheer size of the United States foreign assistance program 
prohibits a complete study of foreign assistance policies to all recipient countries.  Rather 
than embarking on an impossible effort to assess the United States’ foreign assistance 
policies in each country receiving US foreign aid, this paper concentrates on the United 
States foreign assistance policy to Afghanistan and Nicaragua between 1947 and 2001.   
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Though Afghanistan and Nicaragua have incredibly different cultures, histories, 
and locations, both countries have experienced the implementation of similar foreign 
assistance policies from the United States.  The similarity of these policies demonstrates 
that United States foreign assistance policy decisions were consistently based on national 
security concerns, regardless of the geographic location, culture, and history of individual 
recipient countries.  Not only were the policies implemented by the United States in 
Nicaragua and Afghanistan similar, but the detrimental effects created by these policies 
also took on similar forms.  An examination of the history of foreign aid in the United 
States and the history of aid distribution choices the country has made concerning 
Afghanistan and Nicaragua from 1947 to the end of the 20th century demonstrate that the 
United States has used the distribution of foreign assistance to combat perceived security 
threats.  This tactic has led to the creation of instability in recipient countries, increased 
real security risks to the United States and hindered the development of countries that are 
supposed to be helped by aid flows.   
 This paper is separated into five parts: Important definitions, United States foreign 
assistance history, U.S. foreign assistance policy in Afghanistan, U.S. foreign assistance 
policy in Nicaragua and concluding remarks.  In the first portion of the paper, I define 
foreign assistance and security as they will be used throughout the paper.  In the second 
part of the paper, I use a study of the history of the United States foreign assistance 
program to establish that a strong link exists between national security concerns and 
foreign assistance policy decisions made in the United States.  In the third and fourth 
parts of the paper I discuss the impact the United States foreign assistance policy has had 
on Afghanistan and Nicaragua.  Both of these parts are divided into five sections.  The 
first section is a brief introduction to the country, including important background 
information and historical events.  The following three sections are devoted to the three 
key ways in which the United States foreign assistance distribution policies are 
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detrimental to recipient countries.  The first of these sections demonstrates that the lack 
of clear connection between aid flows and the issues facing aid recipients creates 
dramatic fluctuations in aid giving which wreak havoc on fragile economies; the second 
discusses how the proliferation of weapons and advanced military training in already 
turbulent situations increases their danger and helps create a culture of violence within 
recipient countries; and the third assesses the extent to which consistent undermining of 
existing governments or popular revolutions through US interference into the policies of 
recipient countries strips governments of their authority and autonomy.  The final 
sections of parts three and four of the paper address the nature of the security threats 
posed by events taking place in Afghanistan and Nicaragua both before and after U.S. 
involvement.  In the final part of the paper I discuss the foreign assistance policies 
addressed throughout with special emphasis on the results of these policies. 
 
Important Definitions 
What, exactly, are foreign assistance and national security? 
 
Before it is possible to prove the United States’ foreign aid policy has been 
motivated by security threats and has led to increased instability in recipient countries, it 
is necessary to clarify a few key terms which will continue to be important throughout 
this paper.  The first of these is foreign assistance.  Due to the emphasis on the United 
States’ foreign assistance policy in this paper, the definition and categories used to 
describe foreign assistance are derived from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants or 
Greenbook, a publication created by the United States Agency for International 
Development’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation to serve as a 
comprehensive report of all U.S. foreign assistance distributed to the rest of the world 
since 1945.  This publication will not only provide the definitions and categories aid will 
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be divided into within this paper, but also the figures detailing the amount of U.S. aid 
distributed to the world and, more specifically, to Afghanistan and Nicaragua from 1947 
to 2000.   
The “Reporting Concepts” section of the Greenbook separates foreign assistance 
into three overarching categories - economic assistance, military assistance, and non-
concessional support - which are further separated by more specific funding categories 
that fall under these comprehensive headings.  Of the three categories, economic and 
military assistance will figure most prominently in this paper.  According to the 
Greenbook, economic assistance is equivalent to Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) or “grants or loans to [developing] countries and territories which are (a) 
undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and 
welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a 
Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]” (OECD 2005).  The economic assistance 
category includes funds distributed by USAID and its predecessor organizations, Food 
Aid, and other economic assistance and is also divided based on the program this funding 
is slated to aid.  Though the main focus of sections of this paper devoted to the effects of 
the United States’ economic assistance policy will be bilateral aid from the United States 
that fits the standard ODA definition, it is important to note that economic assistance 
provided to or withheld from Afghanistan and Nicaragua by other countries or lending 
institutions due to U.S. influence will also be mentioned.   
In addition to discussing economic assistance as foreign aid, this paper will also 
discuss military assistance.  Though military assistance is less often considered in papers 
discussing the impact of foreign aid, it is important that this type of assistance be 
included in a paper discussing the link between the United States’ foreign assistance 
policy, security and stability as military assistance is often motivated by security 
concerns and has a crucial impact on the stability of recipient countries.  By virtue of the 
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smaller amounts of U.S. assistance that qualify as military assistance, the Greenbook’s 
treatment of this category is much less complex than the economic assistance category.  
Under the military assistance heading only two subcategories - loans and grants - exist.  
Though military assistance is, like economic assistance, further separated by the program 
funding is intended to aid, a clear definition for exactly what physically constitutes 
military assistance in the United States is absent from the Greenbook.  However, it is 
clear that military assistance is classified as such because these loans and grants are 
comprised of money the United States intends recipient countries to use for military 
equipment and training.  In addition to the official military assistance recorded in the U.S. 
Overseas Loans and Grants, the sections of this paper devoted to the impact of U.S. 
military assistance policy on Afghanistan and Nicaragua will also include references to 
and descriptions of covert aid given by the United States to resistance groups within these 
countries.  Though this is not official bilateral aid, it is included as military assistance for 
three reasons: it is funding intended for the upkeep of military forces and actions; it is a 
strong indicator of the motivations of the United States’ foreign aid policy; and it has a 
powerful impact on recipient countries.   
Though United States foreign assistance and its distribution will be the primary 
focus of this paper, the United States’ national security will also figure prominently 
throughout.  Security, like many other terms used in the social sciences, is frequently 
used and often left unclearly defined.  In fact, scholars of security studies David Baldwin 
and Helen Milner, have even argued that “the concept of national security is one of the 
most ambiguous and value-laden terms in social science” (Terriff 1999, 1).  The 
difficulty of defining security stems from the necessity of making a value judgment in 
order to create a definition.  Without identifying a perspective from which security is 
perceived, it would be impossible to truly assess the relative safety of any situation.  As 
this paper will focus on the foreign assistance choices made by the United States 
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government in the latter half of the 20th century due to security threats, it is important to 
establish an understanding of security from the perspective of the United States 
government during this time period.  However, because the definition of security used by 
the United States during the Cold War was heavily skewed by strict adherence to anti-
communist ideology, the security threats discussed in this paper will also be identified as 
either real or perceived security threats.   
During the cold war, definitions of national security in the United States could all 
be traced back to a single origin, the containment doctrine created by George F. Kennan 
in 1947 (Gaddis 2005, 24).  Kennan defined the security of the United States as “the 
continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without 
serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers” (Ibid., 26).  This view 
of security was so prominent during the cold war that it led “largely to the exclusion of 
other perspectives” (Terriff 1999, 1).  As a result, when most policy makers, political 
scientists, and other social scientists discussed security from 1947 to 2001, they agreed 
they were talking about the use and management of military force and the protection of 
the state from attack (Ibid.).   
Though protecting the United States from foreign invasion was a crucial part of 
Kennan’s definition of security, he also asserted that the United States had a 
responsibility “to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which 
this nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development 
of other nations and derive the maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities” 
(Gaddis 2005, 26).  This perspective, combined with Kennan’s views on security, gave 
birth to the doctrine of containment, the primary perspective on national security during 
the cold war.  As time passed and the cold war progressed a new clause, “falling 
dominos”, was added to the containment doctrine (Hastedt 2003, 50).  Under this clause 
it was agreed that any communist “territorial gain, no matter how insignificant, 
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represented a threat to American security because it could be the first in a row of falling 
dominos that could ultimately bring down a vital ally” (Ibid.).  It was through adherence 
to this belief that divergence from the United States’ ideology became synonymous to an 
attack on the United States and was handled as a threat to the country’s national security.         
Due to the fact that the perspective on national security derived from the 
containment doctrine viewed divergence from strict capitalist, democratic ideology as a 
security threat to the United States, it only allowed countries to occupy two categories, 
ally or enemy.  The narrowness of this perspective forced countries into categories that 
did not accurately define them.  It also considerably elevated the number of events the 
United States categorized as national security risks.  As a result, the United States made a 
number of foreign assistance policy decisions due to perceived security threats.  Unlike 
real security threats, which were likely to cause physical harm to the United States or its 
allies, create intense instability in a country or region, or were directly linked to the 
Soviet Union in a plan to spread communism, perceived security threats were often 
rooted in misconceptions arising from the fear of communist expansion and possessed 
unclear, unfounded, or superficial links to the Soviet Union.  Though these two categories 
do not attempt to redefine national security, they do provide a vocabulary with which to 
address the foreign assistance policy decisions made by the United States during the 
second half of the 20th century. 
 
United States foreign assistance history 
Increasing fear increases assistance 
 
“For the United States, aid as an instrument of development and aid as an 
instrument of the Cold War were one in the same (White 1974, 219).” 
 
“Since the late 1940s U.S. assistance activities have often been motivated 
more by our own security concerns than by the objective needs of the 
countries we have attempted to assist (Ruttan 1996, xviii).” 
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After World War II the United States found itself in a unique position of 
economic and political power in the world.  The European nations, ravaged by war, were 
struggling to recover while the division between the Soviet Union and the United States 
continued to grow.  With their only allies against the Soviets in great need of economic 
support to recover, the United States established the first comprehensive proposal for 
development assistance, the Marshall Plan.  This plan, which began in 1947 and lasted 
about three years, was engineered to help the European countries rebuild.  During this 
three year period about $40 billion to $50 billion a year was given to European nations 
(O’Hanlon 1997, 63).    With this aid, Europe was able to use its preexisting institutions, 
skills and social relationships for rapid development to recover quickly (White 1974, 
200); within the decade the recipients of Marshall Plan aid were once again economically 
stable and politically active on the world scene.   
The success of the Marshall Plan not only helped restore the European nations, it 
also created intense optimism concerning the power of economic transfers from the 
United States to other countries.  This optimism and a keen awareness of the changing 
international system led to the creation of a new foreign policy initiative: foreign 
assistance.  During the next fifteen years the political groundwork to establish foreign aid 
as an accepted part of the United States’ foreign policy would be laid as the program’s 
objectives and institutions were revised and established.  Throughout this process, United 
States foreign assistance evolved from a successful foreign policy tool used to tackle the 
United States immediate concerns on the world stage, such as the reconstruction of 
Western European nations, to a development tool that could be used to make the United 
States safer while simultaneously making other nations more prosperous.  Despite these 
changes, the United States’ national security concerns would remain a key factor in 
determining the amount of funding and support the foreign assistance program would 
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receive.  Even after foreign aid objectives grew to encompass development in recipient 
nations, the United States’ national security concerns would continue to be the primary 
consideration in determining the focus and amount of aid flows.  Throughout its 
development in the United States, foreign aid policy and flows would remain inextricably 
linked to the nation’s security concerns.     
The first steps in the evolution of foreign assistance were taken during Harry S. 
Truman’s presidency.  After implementing the Marshall Plan, Truman created the 
Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in 1950 in order to help make “the benefits 
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas” (Butterfield 2004, 1).  In addition to demonstrating 
recognition that the needs of countries in the developing world were different from those 
of Europe, where the institutions, skills, and social bonds necessary for development 
were already present, the establishment of the TCA demonstrated the presence of 
humanitarian motivation for aid in the United States.   
Despite the presence of this motivation, security concerns were clearly the 
primary force motivating aid throughout the Truman administration and during most of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency as well.  The dominance of security concerns was 
clear in everything from the title of aid legislation to the areas where aid was distributed.  
When aid proposals were first combined into a single legislative package in 1951, the act 
presented to Congress was entitled the Mutual Securities Act.  This legislation indicated 
the United States’ belief that assistance could be beneficial for the security of both donor 
and recipient.  The act also created the Mutual Securities Agency (MSA) to be 
responsible for “all financial and technical aid and for some aspects of military 
assistance” (Butterfield 2004, 36).  Though Eisenhower would indicate the new concern 
for the development of recipient countries growing within the United States foreign 
assistance dialogue by replacing the existing foreign aid institutions with the International 
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Cooperation Administration in 1955 (Ibid. 39), these efforts would not greatly alter the 
extreme emphasis on security present in the 1950s.  The dominance of security concerns 
was demonstrated by the continued use of the Mutual Securities Act title for foreign 
assistance legislation until 1961 and by the choices the United States made concerning 
aid recipients.  Between 1953 and 1957, the greatest part of the United States’ economic 
aid was delivered to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea (Nelson 1968, 3).  These countries were selected to 
become recipients of high amounts of aid due to their proximity to the Soviet Union and 
China, the United States involvement in the Korean War, and the United States fear that 
communism was gaining strength across Asia.    
Despite the fact that foreign assistance rhetoric and distribution during the 
Eisenhower presidency support the conclusion that the primary objective conceived for 
foreign aid throughout the 1950s was simply to immediately address security issues, 
some of the legislation enacted under Eisenhower demonstrated the growing emphasis on 
the development aspect of foreign assistance.  The first piece of legislation to indicate 
this was enacted in 1954, when Public Law 480 (P.L. 480), the legal basis for food aid 
from the United States to other nations, was passed.  Though this occurred thanks in large 
part to lobbying by the American Farm Bureau Association and farmers who feared the 
effects that agricultural surpluses facilitated by Depression era policies would have on 
their incomes (Singer 1987, 22), it also demonstrated the growing belief that foreign aid 
policies could be used as tools to improve life both in the United States and elsewhere.  
This belief was reiterated in 1957 when Eisenhower created the Development Loan Fund 
to provide loans in the form of US dollars to developing countries for projects they were 
unable to fund through private capital (Butterfield 2004, 54).  Though the creation of 
such an institution, in and of itself, demonstrates a growing interest in the development of 
recipient countries, the revolutionary decision to allow DLF loan repayment in the 
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currency of the borrowing nation indicated the extent of the growing commitment to 
ensuring developing nations were truly aided by foreign assistance (Ibid). 
This commitment became an even larger focus of foreign assistance policy during 
the presidency of John F. Kennedy.  During his inaugural speech in 1961, the new 
president famously declared foreign aid should be used to help people in developing 
countries, “not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, 
but because it is right” (Ibid., 57).  The changes Kennedy made during his first year in 
office seemed to support this concept.  He began by proposing the separation of military 
and economic assistance into two categories in a new foreign aid bill entitled the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961.  This piece of legislation not only revolutionized aid through the 
policies it suggested, it also ushered in a new aid vocabulary that placed more emphasis 
on development and less on security.  In addition to proposing new legislation, the 
Kennedy administration also introduced a new institution, the Agency for International 
Development (USAID), to coordinate development assistance in the United States.  
Unlike the aid bureaucracy that came before it, USAID was an autonomous institution 
charged with executing foreign assistance plans the world over according to a single 
comprehensive policy (USAID History 2005).     
The changes enacted during Kennedy’s presidency reflected the growing interest 
in economic aid for development.  However, they also reflected President Kennedy’s 
ability to “[translate] the security concerns of the 1950s into greater support for economic 
development assistance” (Ruttan 1996, 92).   Though much of the rhetoric used 
emphasized the importance of development in poor nations, Kennedy’s final rational for 
foreign assistance was the argument that without it “our own security would be 
endangered and our prosperity imperiled” (USAID History 2005).  These remarks 
indicate that even though foreign assistance policy was changing to create a separation 
between economic and military aid, security concerns had not receded as the primary 
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motivation for both types of assistance.  “The basic assumption was that the 
establishment of ‘a preponderance of stable, effective, and democratic societies gives the 
best promise of a peaceful settlement of the Cold War and of a peaceful progressive 
environment’” (White 1974, 219). 
Both this assumption and the changes in foreign assistance policy made under the 
Kennedy administration proved to be lasting.  Though Richard Nixon made a failed 
attempt to alter the structure of the foreign aid program when he entered office in 1969 
(Butterfield 2004, 175) and Jimmy Carter created the short lived and ineffective 
International Development Cooperation Agency during his presidency in the late 1970s 
(Ibid, 197), the Foreign Assistance Act and USAID remained the primary instruments of 
United States foreign assistance policy from their inception in 1961 through the end of 
the 20th century.  From this point on, major changes in foreign aid took place in the 
amounts and areas of allocation rather than in institutions.  Like “the expansion of the aid 
program leading up to and including the 1961 initiatives, [which] paralleled an increase 
in the perceived security threat of spreading communism” (Ruttan 1996, 70), the changes 
in foreign assistance funding and allocation that took place in the latter portion of the 20th 
century were heavily impacted by national security concerns.   
The impact of the United States security concerns on foreign assistance funding is 
demonstrated in Figure 1.  This graph shows the fluctuations in the total amounts 
allocated for economic and military loans and grants by the United States from 1946 to 
2001 along with some key events that reduced or heightened the United States’ emphasis 
on national security.  The amounts of foreign assistance appropriated each year are taken 
from figures made available by the United States Agency for International 
Development’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation and are given in 
constant 2003 dollars in order to remove considerations of inflation from the analysis.  
When viewed together, the correlation between spikes in aid and events that created 
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national security concerns for the United States is clear.  Large, sudden increases in 
foreign assistance funding followed events that increased the United States’ national 
security concerns, such as the beginning of the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs, the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, and the Camp David Accords, while sudden dramatic decreases in 
funding followed events that decreased national security concerns, like the removal of 
troops from Vietnam and the end of the cold war.   
In addition to providing insight concerning the link between security and foreign 
assistance funding in the United States, Figure 1 also indicates the respective approaches 
various U.S. presidents took towards foreign assistance and the great deal historical 
context contributed to these approaches.  For example, foreign assistance funding 
increased considerably during the Kennedy administration due to the changes in the 
foreign assistance program and the Bay of Pigs, but dropped off in the early years of 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency.   This decrease in foreign assistance would soon 
change, as increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam became the most significant security 
concern of the United States.   
The significance of Vietnam and other major security issues to the distribution of 
United States foreign assistance is evident in both the areas of the world large amounts of 
aid were distributed to and the policy choices made by American presidents.  Figure 2 
shows the percentage of foreign assistance distributed to six areas of the world during 
five important historical periods.  The figures presented in this table indicate that foreign 
assistance distribution is concentrated in areas where the largest security concern for the 
United States originates.  This was especially true of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 
which, according to Figure 2, encouraged the United States to distribute 61% of foreign 
aid to Asia in 1964.  Involvement in South-East Asia would lead the Johnson 
administration to increase the number of USAID advisors in Vietnam from 300 to 1,000 
in the short span of sixty days (Butterfield 2004, 93) and ensure the decisions on foreign 
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assistance policy made by the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford were 
altered by growing opposition to the Vietnam War in the United States.  Nixon’s efforts 
to make his own mark on foreign assistance were overturned in Congress in favor of 
changes directed by the legislative body (Ibid., 175) while the backlash against U.S. 
commitments in the world led Ford to allow aid appropriations to stagnate until 1976 
(Ibid., 197).  Even the Carter administration was impacted by the ghost of Vietnam.  
Though he was able to broker a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in September 
1978 by promising to deliver $3 billion in aid to be split between the two countries each 
year for the foreseeable future (Ibid.), Carter was unable to maintain his commitment to 
“the restoration of moral purpose in American foreign policy” (Ruttan 1996, 115).  
Despite his contributions to increasing the focus on human rights and a dialogue between 
the North and South, by the end of his presidency traditional security and economic 
concerns took precedent for Carter (Ibid., 121).   
The emphasis on security brought about by perceived communist gains in 
Afghanistan and Nicaragua at the end of Carter’s presidency became even stronger when 
Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981.  The new president approached foreign assistance 
in a way no president before him had.  Not only did he urge a shift from economic 
assistance to military and security assistance, Reagan was also determined to give aid to 
“friendly nations regarded as threatened by internal or external forces and cut aid to 
governments considered unfriendly, uncooperative, or mismanaged” (Ibid.).   Reagan’s 
intentions to use foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool in the Cold War were not 
unusual.  However, the aggressive manner in which he regained control of the foreign 
assistance program from the legislature and increased the power the executive branch had 
over assistance by increasing the bilateral component of the United States assistance 
program were very different from the tactics used by presidents that preceded him (Ibid.).  
Reagan also began distributing covert assistance to insurgent groups fighting against the 
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spread of communism in other nations and increased the percentage of the foreign 
assistance budget allocated to the Economic Support Fund, the location from which most 
capital for U.S. security interests is obtained, from under 50% in the early 1980s to over 
65% in 1985 (Butterfield 2004, 199).   
As a result of Reagan’s aggressive tactics the foreign assistance budget steadily 
increased throughout his first term as president (see Figure 1).  However, scandals 
accompanied Reagan’s covert assistance programs and ruined the credibility of his 
foreign assistance projects with the American people.  Due to lack of support in the 
United States and a warming in East-West relations, the second Reagan administration 
allowed the legislative branch to regain control of the foreign assistance program, 
lessened covert commitments to insurgent groups, and again attempted to participate in 
multilateral international institutions (Ruttan 1996, 133).  By the end of Reagan’s second 
term in 1989, foreign assistance appropriations had dropped considerably and the end of 
the cold war was eminent.   
The dramatic changes taking place in the international system in the 1990s 
removed the context in which the foreign assistance program had always been defined 
and presented both an impressive challenge and an impressive opportunity for the 
administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton to redefine the foreign aid program and 
its objectives.  Unfortunately, neither the Bush administration nor the Clinton 
administration took the initiative to revitalize foreign assistance in the United States.  
Instead, the aid program stagnated with the USAID administration remaining in disarray 
for most of President Bush’s time in office and funding declining steadily from 1985 until 
1997 (Butterfield 2004, 219).  Trouble for the major foreign assistance institution 
continued under the Clinton administration’s downsizing campaign, which cut 60% of 
funding to agricultural programs between 1992 and 1997 and decreased the number of 
positions in USAID by 30% from 1993 to 1997 (Ibid., 221).  The decisions made by 
 Kersey 16 
Bush and Clinton to first ignore and then downsize the foreign assistance program 
demonstrate as clearly as the policy of U.S. presidents that utilized foreign assistance, 
that the program’s well-being is inextricably linked to the amount of concern present for 
U.S. national security.   
The evolution of the foreign assistance program in the United States into an 
accepted part of the United States foreign policy was driven by the U.S. government’s 
efforts to determine the most effective way foreign assistance could be used to address 
the communist threat.  By 1961 the quest for optimal utilization of the program had led 
away from the origin of foreign assistance as a program to address immediate foreign 
policy goals by immediately solving problems towards a new view of the program in 
which long-term development goals served the interests of the United States national 
security.  Despite the adoption of a new strategy to address the United States security 
interests with long-term development assistance, funding and support for foreign aid 
remained dependent on the immediacy of the United States national security concerns.  
The strong link between national security and foreign assistance appropriations is 
demonstrated in funding fluctuations, as represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, and in the 
policies and rhetoric of the U.S. presidents from Truman to Clinton.  Though some 
presidents’ policies were more influential and lasting than others, even those who were 
inactive demonstrated the impact security concerns had on the United States’ foreign 
assistance policy. 
 
U.S. foreign assistance policy in Afghanistan  
A brief history 
 
Home to about 28.5 million people, based on an estimate made in July 2004, 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country in Southern Asia bordered by Pakistan, Iran, 
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Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and China (CIA “Afghanistan” 2005).  Though 
many citizens of the United States might be hard pressed to find it on a map, Afghanistan 
is located at a key intersection between the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia 
(Lansford 2003, 31).  This location has made Afghanistan a major thoroughfare during 
countless military campaigns and imperial conquests including those of Alexander the 
Great, the Russian tsars and the British Raj, not to mention those of the United States and 
the Soviet Union.   
  Consequently, when the borders of the Afghan state were delineated they had 
little to do with the locations of various cohesive ethnic groups and everything to do with 
colonial arguments over land possession.  As a result, the inhabitants of Afghanistan 
represent 21 different ethnic groups.  Many of these groups have a small representation 
within Afghanistan and are separated from large populations of their ethnic brothers by 
Afghanistan’s borders.  Attempts to unite ethnic groups, especially the Pashtuns, within 
the borders of a single country continued throughout the twentieth century, increasing 
tensions in South Asia.  In addition to the divisions created by various ethnic 
representations within Afghanistan, there are also sectarian, tribal, racial, and 
geographical divisions within the country (Goodson 2001, 12). 
Despite the great range of peoples in Afghanistan and the divergent customs of 
each of these groups, the population is unified by its shared religious beliefs.  Though 
different groups interpret and practice Islam in different ways, the religion has played a 
major role as a unifier for the many factions within the country (Ibid.).  This was first 
demonstrated by the cohesion it created during the late nineteenth century in the two 
Anglo-Afghan wars: altercations through which the British attempted to place 
Afghanistan under its direct control (Johnson 2004, 14).  Lucky for the Afghans, the 
British agreed to cease their quest for internal control of Afghanistan in return for control 
of the country’s external affairs.  In this way, Afghanistan was able to play the two major 
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powers in South Asia off of each other and maintain its independence from both Russia 
and England during the nineteenth century.  Afghanistan’s luck with remaining 
uninvolved in major conflict continued in the first half of the twentieth century with the 
country managing to stay uninvolved in the two World Wars. 
However, the end of World War II found Afghanistan once again struggling to 
maintain its autonomy.  With the British in no position to continue their traditional power 
struggle with the Soviets in the region, the Afghan government, led by King Zamir Shah, 
feared Soviet domination.  In order to combat this lack of balance, officials from the 
Afghan government, especially then Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, began to seek 
aid and assistance from the United States.  Despite the fact that leaders in Afghanistan 
were ready to begin modernizing and would have gladly stood with the U.S. against the 
Soviets in the event of Soviet invasion, the United States remained “convinced that 
extensive involvement in Afghanistan would merely provide the Soviets with a pretext 
for action while overburdening the Afghan budget” (Roberts 2003, 186).  As a result of 
this belief, the United States remained relatively uninvolved in Afghanistan for the early 
part of the post-World War II period.  The U.S. did counter the increasing flow of aid 
from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan with some aid of its own, but this aid was minimal 
and had few positive effects on Afghanistan.   
While the United States half heartedly participated in a bidding war with the 
Soviets, the first of many changes that would take place within the Afghan government in 
the second half of the twentieth century began.  Interested in creating a constitutional 
monarchy, Zahir Shah promulgated a new constitution in 1964 that also created an 
elected, consultative parliament (Rubin 1995, 25).  The establishment of the constitution 
prevented relatives of the monarchy from holding government positions and began a 
decade of “New Democracy” in Afghanistan.  This new era also saw the development of 
political parties within Afghanistan.  Though many groups were created during this time, 
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two of the groups that formed during the late 1960s, the communists and the Islamists, 
would later become instrumental in the future of Afghanistan.   
Founded in January 1965 in the home of Nur Muhammad Taraki (Rasanayagam 
2003, 48), the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was the principle 
Soviet-oriented Communist organization in Afghanistan (Rubin 1995, 26). The original 
objective of the PDPA was to “resolve the fundamental contradictions within Afghan 
society” through socialism (Rasanayagam 2003, 48).  Though many PDPA leaders 
received their military training in the USSR and the party began as a unified force, it split 
into two factions, the Khalq led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and the Parcham led by 
Babrak Karmal, as early as 1967 (Rubin 1995, 26).  The more radical of the two factions, 
the Khalq, recruited from the newly educated rural population, mainly tribal Pashtuns 
(Ibid.), and believed in creating a socialist state in Afghanistan through violent revolution  
(Rasanayagam 2003, 49).  In contrast, the leader of the Parcham faction, Karmal, 
believed in the ‘national democratic’ road to socialism (Ibid.) and recruited from the 
middle and upper classes of the urban elite (Rubin 1995, 26).   
 During the same year the PDPA was founded, a new offshoot of the Islamic 
movement in Afghanistan emerged among students and instructors at Kabul University 
(Ibid.).  Initially this movement simply consisted of members of the Theology department 
at the University participating in “informal groups to discuss Islam’s role in the country 
and ways to save it from the threat of communism” (Saikal 2004, 165).  However, soon 
the movement grew and in 1968 established the Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic 
Society of Afghanistan), an Islamists’ organization (Ibid.).  A year later, Islamist groups 
from the Faculty of Engineering, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, joined forces with the 
existing organization and a new group, the Nahzat-e Jawanan-e Musulman-e Afghanistan 
(Afghan Muslim Youth Movement) was established.  Prominent Islamists, such as 
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Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani, were also key members of these 
organizations.      
The growing acceptance of Islamist groups as mainstream actors in the Afghan 
political spectrum, along with his inability to participate legally in government led 
Daoud, with the Parcham faction of the PDPA, to depose King Zahir Shah on July 17, 
1973.  With the help of newly trained professional military officers, Daoud’s seizure of 
power went smoothly.  However, in the long run, Daoud’s decision to depose the king 
increased instability by obliterating the old succession pattern without installing a new 
one.  This increased instability in Afghanistan, coupled with increasing cold war tensions 
in the 1970s led the US and the USSR to support increased aid flows to political groups 
challenging the Afghan regime from Pakistan (Rubin 1995, 26).  Daoud responded to 
these aid increases with efforts to remove all opposition to his control of the Afghan 
government.   
In 1974, he repressed the growing Islamic movement by arresting some Islamist 
militants, while others fled and took to the hills near Keshem in the province of 
Badakhshan, where they were led by Dr Omar.  Other Islamist leaders, namely Massoud 
and Hekmatyar, were forced to flee to Peshawar, in Pakistan where they received aid 
from the Pakistani government and the CIA (Rubin 1995, 27).  During this time Daoud 
was also making an effort to remove the Parcham elements from influential government 
and military posts, a task he completed by 1975 (Rasanayagam 2003, 64).  Daoud 
continued his efforts to keep the communists from infiltrating his government by 
excluding them from the new cabinet formed in January 1977 (Dorronsoro 2005, 83).  
Regardless of these efforts, some “closet communists” remained in the government 
(Rasanayagam 2003, 64) and still others managed to receive new appointments 
(Dorronsoro 2005, 83).   
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While Daoud’s efforts to suppress opposition to his government were partially 
successful, he was still plagued by attempts to overthrow his regime.  Failed attempts to 
overthrow the new Daoud government were made by the Islamists in the summer of 1975 
and by the military in September 1975 and December 1976 (Ibid., 79).  Finally, on April 
27, 1978, an attempt to remove Daoud was successful.  The self-proclaimed president of 
Afghanistan was killed during a communist coup d’état that came to be known as the 
Saur Revolution.  This revolution, led by a unified PDPA, and backed by the Soviets was 
met with indifference by most of the Afghan population.  According to Louis Dupree, an 
observer, “despite the danger, people queued up for buses- even in the firefight zone!  
Taxis honked for tanks to move over, and wove in and out as the fighting continued.  At 
some corners, traffic policemen motioned for the tanks to pull over to the curb.  The tanks 
ignored the gestures and rumbled on to their objectives” (Roberts 2003, 213).     
Three days after Daoud’s death, the Revolutionary Council announced 
Afghanistan would now be known as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and be led 
by Taraki, who would assume the titles of Prime Minister and president of the 
Revolutionary Council (Dorronsoro 2005, 86).  Though the PDPA had unified in order to 
overthrow Dauod, their alliance had predominantly been a result of Soviet pressures and 
did not last (Ruibn 1995, 26).  Trouble within the new communist government began 
almost immediately with Taraki and Amin, the two key party leaders of the Khalq portion 
of the PDPA, vying for absolute power over the party.  To exacerbate the already existing 
turmoil within the communist camp, Taraki’s installation as the president of Afghanistan 
was quickly followed by the mobilization of the Islamic groups that had been banished to 
Peshawar under Daoud’s rule.  These organizations, which were the only organized 
political bodies remaining after the splintering of Afghan elites, began training Muslim 
soldiers for jihad - “a holy war that can only be waged against non-Muslims and 
apostates”- against the communists (Clement 2003, 174).  Over the course of their 
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struggle with the Soviets, the Afghan resistance and its various components came to be 
known as the mujahideen, the plural form of the word mujahid, which is used to identify 
practitioners of jihad (Maley 2002, 59).   
While the Islamist groups prepared for battle, the Soviet Union began to increase 
its involvement within the communist government in Afghanistan.  Instability within the 
PDPA was mirrored by instability within the Afghan state created by a rebellion in 1978 
that began in response to the government’s radical reform program (Goodson 2001, 55).   
Despite intense debate in Moscow, increasing turmoil in Afghanistan forced the Soviet 
Union to make a visible response to the uncertain hold the PDPA had on Afghanistan.  
This response began in 1979 with a considerable increase in the presence of Soviet troops 
and advisors to the communist regime in Afghanistan (Clement 2003, 299-300).  The 
increase in Soviet advisors was just the beginning.  Despite international condemnation, 
Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979.  This move began a 
thirteen year altercation between the Soviet backed communist regime and soldiers of the 
Islamist groups, the mujahideen, who received support from Pakistan, other Islamic 
states, and the United States. 
War between the mujahideen and the communists lasted throughout the 1980s 
with both sides receiving huge amounts of economic and military support from 
international forces.  For the mujahideen, international support also came in the form of 
soldiers, with Muslims from all over South Asia flocking to Afghanistan to join the jihad.  
Despite continuing war within Afghanistan, negotiations to create a peace treaty, entitled 
the Geneva Accords, began in the U.N. as early as 1985.  Though the negotiations of the 
Geneva Accords centered on the relationship between Afghanistan’s communist 
government and Pakistan with the United States and the USSR in a secondary role, a 
separate accord addressed the roles the two superpowers were playing in Afghanistan.  In 
the second accord negotiated at Geneva in 1988, both the USSR and the USA agreed to 
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be guarantors of the peace made between the Afghan government and Pakistan and to a 
policy of noninterference in Afghanistan (Ibid., 90).   
Despite this agreement, both the USA and the USSR continued to intervene in 
Afghan politics.  Soviet troops did not withdraw from the country until February 1989 
and when they finally departed they left behind a considerable amount of weaponry and 
promises to provide more to the communist government in Kabul.  Loathe to let the 
Soviet Union get the upper hand in their ideological struggle, the United States continued 
sending considerable amounts of assistance to the mujahideen through Pakistan until 
mujahideen forces took Kabul in April 1992 (Dorronsoro 2005, 238).  With the 
communist government eliminated and the Gulf War raging, U.S. funding to the 
mujahideen stopped and the once unified Islamist force began the fragmentation that 
would lead to a decade of civil war.   
During this time period the Taliban, a fundamental Islamist group with roots in 
the battle against the Soviets, emerged in Southern Afghanistan.  The Taliban increased 
its power and appeal quickly and by 1996, the group was in control of most of 
Afghanistan, including Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad (Ibid., 248).  Due to the stability they 
brought to Afghanistan and their ability to bring the opium trade under control, the 
Taliban began their time in power with the United States’ support.  However, this 
recognition of the Taliban dissolved quickly as the U.S. became disillusioned with the 
radical nature of the Taliban regime and the extreme human rights violations they 
committed.  As the 1990s ended, these issues were exacerbated by the Taliban’s 
connections with Osama bin Laden, a former mujahideen supporter whose anti-Western 
rhetoric became increasingly violent during the 1990s and whose network of operatives, 
Al’Quaida, were linked to a number of anti-American bombings.  Though they meant 
little to Afghanistan at the time, these bombings were a harbinger of events to come in 
the next century. 
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Failures in economic funding: From Helmand to Qandahar  
 
Despite extensive efforts on the part of the Afghan government to court the 
United States, the U.S. refused to deepen its relationship with the South Asian state.  
Instead, for much of the post-war era the United States provided minimal economic aid 
and required this aid be used for ill-conceived development projects orchestrated by 
American companies.  The lack of interest the United States paid to Afghanistan coupled 
with the interest the US paid to the country’s neighbors led Afghanistan to turn to the 
Soviet Union to acquire funding for development projects.  Increased funding from the 
Soviet Union soon led to a half-hearted bidding war between the United States and the 
USSR.  Despite the slight increase in U.S. economic aid this bidding war heralded, 
Afghanistan was never able to encourage the United States to devote as much economic 
assistance to its needs as the U.S. devoted to Pakistan and Iran.  Consequently, 
Afghanistan’s development was purchased at the cost of increased dependence on the 
Soviet Union.  After this dependence led to Soviet invasion and then all out civil war, 
Afghanistan’s development was abandoned by the United States; first in favor of military 
assistance to the mujahideen resistance fighters and later, when the threat of Soviet take 
over disappeared, in favor of relative neglect.   
When World War II ended, Britain was in no condition to maintain its traditional 
position of influence within Asia. With no Western power to balance out the Soviets, 
Afghanistan immediately turned to the United States to take the place of Britain in South 
Asian politics.  The initial response from U.S. officials to requests for aid was 
unenthusiastic.  By the time the United States became willing to become a presence in 
South Asia, it had already chosen Pakistan and Iran as its major charges in the region and 
saw Afghanistan as a buffer state already too far under Soviet influence to merit much 
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attention.  Poor relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and continued aid from the 
Soviets also made US officials leery of giving more aid to Afghanistan.   
Though the Afghan government’s entreaties for U.S. aid to help implement 
development programs did not inspire the United States to give aid to Afghanistan, 
increased aid from the Soviets did.  In response to increases in Soviet aid, the United 
States began distributing some technical and economic assistance of its own.  Much of 
this assistance focused on the betterment of Afghan infrastructure, aviation, education, 
and food production.  Projects ranged from loans for the purchase of airplanes to grants 
for colleges in the United States that would send teachers to Afghan schools.  All told, the 
US gave some $533 million in aid to Afghanistan between 1955 and 1978 (Johnson 2004, 
21).  Though 71 percent of this assistance was given in grant form (Rasanayagam 2003, 
56), this number pales in comparison to the $2.52 billion donated by the USSR in the 
same time frame (Johnson 2004, 21). 
Not only did the amount of U.S. aid given to Afghanistan pale in comparison to 
Soviet aid, so did the projects implemented with United States funding.  According to 
historian Jeffery J. Roberts, “American programs continued to neglect the private sector, 
took too long to mature, and remained less noticeable and thus less influential than Soviet 
projects” (Roberts 2003, 208).  A good example of this phenomenon was the Qandahar 
International Airport for which funds were approved in 1956.  Though funding had been 
approved, it took another year for a construction contract for the airport to be signed and 
still another year for construction on the airport to begin.  By the time construction was 
finally finished in 1962, the airport was rendered useless by jet technology that 
eliminated the need for it as a stopover point, the initial motivation for its construction.  
As a result of its untimely completion, the Qandahar Airport remained unused until the 
1980s when the Soviets turned it into an airbase from which to attack the mujahideen 
(Ibid.).   
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However, the misuse of US economic funding in Afghanistan was already 
underway long before the Qandahar International Airport project was conceived.  During 
the late 1940s and 1950s, the majority of United States funding to Afghanistan was 
directed towards the Helmand River Valley Project.  This undertaking began in 1946 
when the Afghan government contracted the Morrison-Knudson Company of Boise, 
Idaho to construct two dams and a number of canals in the Helmand and Arghandab 
River Valleys and to train Afghan workers in the maintenance and supply functions of the 
new architecture.  The money originally allotted for construction was quickly exhausted 
and soon Afghanistan’s foreign exchange surplus was lost to Morrison-Knudson and 
Pakistani “entrepreneurs” involved in the project (Ibid., 165).  When the Afghan 
government approached the U.S. in 1949 with requests for funding to undertake a number 
of development projects, the U.S. ignored pleas for all aid except that used for the 
Helmand River Valley Project.  However, even the $21 million loan the United States 
approved for this venture was given at a very high interest rate, ensuring the Afghan 
government would incur considerable debt through its use (Ibid., 166).   
An increase in Afghanistan’s debt was not the only result of the exclusive support 
the United States gave the Helmand Project.  The United States’ obvious partiality to the 
project, and, in turn, Morrison-Knudson soon led the Afghans to believe the US 
government was only concerned with ensuring the profits of American businesses (Ibid., 
167).  The damage done by this belief was increased by the problems the Helmand River 
Valley Project created including increased soil salination, the displacement of 1,300 
nomads and peasant farmers, and the loss of foreign exchange surpluses (Clement 2003, 
108).  Even after years of work and the use of considerable amounts of funding, the 
Helmand River Valley Project created more new problems than positive returns. 
Though the United States aid funding was often misused and less helpful than 
Soviet aid, the Afghan government still relied on it to maintain economic stability. 
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During the 1960s, more than forty percent of Afghanistan’s state revenues were derived 
from foreign aid (Dorronsoro 2005, 63).  This reliance proved highly detrimental to the 
country when both the United States and the Soviet Union, by far the country’s two 
largest aid donors, began to curtail aid programs to Afghanistan in the late 1960s.  The 
loss of foreign funds this curtailment spawned created an increasingly stagnant Afghan 
economy.  During 1970 and 1971, a drought and famine exacerbated the economic 
trouble, bringing about the death of an estimated 100,000 people and devastating 
livestock (Roberts 2003, 211).   
Despite some increases in aid flows from the United States in 1972 and 1973, by 
1978 Afghanistan’s economic and social indicators were the worst in the world.  Almost 
the entire rural population was without electricity, there was one doctor for every 16,000 
Afghans, and 80% of these medics resided in Kabul (Rasanayagam 2003, 56).  Health 
indicators were not the only that suffered.  The numbers for education were also shocking 
with 76% of Afghan children receiving no formal education and the Afghan population’s 
literacy rate ranking 127th in the world (Ibid., 57). 
Despite the horrible conditions in Afghanistan, United States economic aid to the 
country decreased during the late 1970s due to a period of détente in the cold war 
(Dorronsoro 2005, 65).  However, this period of decreased aid did not last long.  The end 
of the 1970s heralded a complete transformation in the United States’ aid relationship 
with Afghanistan.  This change was inspired by the rise of the PDPA to power in 1977 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that followed.  The emergence of a staunchly 
communist government in Afghanistan backed by Soviet troops led to a new emphasis on 
military aid to the only truly organized opposition group in the country, the mujahideen.   
The beginning of support for the mujahideen was simultaneous with the end of United 
States economic aid to the Afghan government.  Though aid donations to the government 
were curtailed from 1980 to 1984, they were not absent for the entire decade.  The 
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extreme devastation caused by Soviet tactics inspired many in the international 
community to provide funding to Afghanistan.  Beginning in 1986 the United States also 
stepped in and renewed donations to the Afghan government in the form of food aid 
(Standard Country Report: Afghanistan, 2005).   
Food aid remained the dominant form of United States economic assistance to the 
Afghan government through the rest of the conflict between the communists and the 
mujahideen in the 1980s and during the civil war that followed in the 1990s (Ibid.).  
Though these donations did address the fall in agricultural output Afghanistan 
experienced as a result of the war, they did little to address the deterioration of Afghan 
infrastructure and social systems caused by the fighting.  By the early 1990s, about sixty 
percent of Afghan schools had no building, the road system had deteriorated 
dramatically, and irrigation systems were greatly damaged (Maley 2002, 156).  Clearly, 
post-war Afghanistan retained few of the positive effects economic assistance from the 
United States before the war had yielded and in many ways the country was far worse off 
than it had been before aid from the United States had begun. 
 
Military funding:  Maintaining the mujahideen 
 
As one US official noted, ‘our objectives weren’t peace and grooviness in 
Afghanistan, our objective was killing commies and getting the Russians out’ 
(Lansford 2003, 144).   
 
After World War II, the United States, seeing the dissolution of traditional British 
power in South Asia as a potential security threat, began looking for allies to counteract 
Soviet influence in the region.  Though Afghanistan presented itself early on as an 
interested party, the United States’ fear that the country could be easily influenced by the 
Soviet Union led it to refuse repeated requests from the Afghan government for military 
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aid.  Despite continued entreaties and the decision to give economic aid to the Afghan 
government, the United States continued to withhold military contributions.  This 
decision increased Afghan military dependence on the Soviet Union and eventually led to 
the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in 1979.  As a result of this invasion, 
military aid donations from the United States began to find their way into Afghanistan to 
support the mujahideen Islamist groups who were fighting the Soviet-backed communist 
regime.  Throughout the mujahideen’s battle with the Soviets, the United States remained 
one of the primary donors of military aid and equipment.  Though the United States 
remained heavily involved in donating aid to the mujahideen, its involvement in 
distributing this aid was minimal.  Instead of distributing aid directly, the United States 
delivered aid through Pakistan, which increased the severity of leaks in the weapons 
supply pipeline.  In addition to inundating the region with weaponry, United States 
assistance to the mujahideen also allowed the resistance groups to lengthen the span of 
their war against the Soviets.  The lengthening of the struggle did little to encourage the 
stabilization of the Afghan government and left many Afghans dead or injured and still 
more completely uprooted from their homes.  
Though the United States did not formally recognize Afghanistan until 1934, the 
country’s requests for military aid began in the 1940s (Roberts 2003, 165).  From the 
beginning, these requests were ignored.  Despite the U.S. governments’ consistent lack of 
interest in Afghanistan, there were some experts on the issue who believed the United 
States should reconsider its position.  In 1954, Chester Bowles, the former ambassador to 
India, argued against neglecting Afghanistan while giving arms aid to Pakistan because 
this move would ‘almost certainly result in [Afghanistan’s] acceptance of military aid and 
economic assistance’ from the Soviet Union, which would foster increased penetration of 
the Afghan state (Ibid., 154).  Despite these warnings, the United States gave increasing 
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amounts of support to Pakistan, one of Afghanistan’s major political rivals, while 
continuing to ignore Afghan pleas for aid.   
As the United States made decisions that pushed Afghanistan away, the Soviet 
Union’s choices ensured its relationship with Afghanistan grew stronger.  Between 1955 
and 1972 Afghanistan received nearly ½ billion dollars of military aid from the USSR.  
This amounted to 95% of Afghanistan’s total military aid during this period and included 
MiG-17 fighters, IL-28 light bombers, T-34 tanks, howitzers, and armored personnel 
carriers (Ibid., 206).  Though the United States feared Afghanistan would use weapons 
against U.S. interests in South Asia, these fears proved to be unfounded.  Instead of 
creating a pro-communist state in Afghanistan, increased military assistance gave the 
military enough strength to implement the Afghan government’s development programs 
(Ibid., 207).  Though the Afghan government did not actively use Soviet military aid to 
the detriment of U.S. interests in South Asia, increased arms supplies from the Soviets 
did influence the power structure of the region by increasing Afghanistan’s dependence 
on the Soviets for military repairs (Ibid., 207). 
Despite Afghanistan’s growing reliance on the Soviets, military aid to the country 
from the United States continued to be virtually non-existent.  However, all this changed 
when Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 1979.  From this point on, the United States 
began to supply the Afghan group fighting the communists, the mujahideen, with both 
overt and covert military aid.  Though a significant portion of the military aid given to the 
mujahideen during the decade was covert, the aid figures given by scholars are fairly 
consistent.  According to the figures given by Larry P. Goodson, which can be found in 
their entirety in graph 2, the total amount of covert military aid given by the United States 
to the mujahideen during the 1980s is somewhere between $2.45 and $2.7 billion 
(Goodson 2001, 146).  Though aid donations began small, they grew consistently until 
they reached a high of $600 million in 1987 (Ibid.).  The quality of weapons sent to the 
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mujahideen during this time period also improved from assault rifles, machine guns, 82-
mm mortars and SAM-7 missiles in the early 1980s to Swiss Oerlikon 20-mm anti-
aircraft guns, 107-mm multi-barreled rocket launchers, and U.S. Redeye and Stinger 
missiles in the mid-1980s (Ibid.).   Though the aid the United States distributed to the 
mujahideen evolved over the course of the conflict, the means of distribution did not.  
United States’ aid to the mujahideen was funneled through Pakistan throughout the 
1980s.  This single factor gave birth to some of the most negative effects United States 
military funding to the mujahideen would create.   
Initially, distributing aid through Pakistan simply limited funding to the 
mujahideen due to fears that higher amounts of aid would encourage the Soviets to 
retaliate against Pakistan for its role in aid distribution (Ibid., 145).  However, soon a 
much more lasting effect became obvious.  Throughout the 1980s a large discrepancy 
between the amounts of weapons purchased for the mujahideen and the amount the 
soldiers actually received pointed to a leak in the arms distribution pipeline.  Where these 
leaks originated was impossible for the United States to determine as the CIA only 
controlled the first leg of the route, during which weapons were purchased and sent to 
Pakistan (Rasanayagam 2003, 112).  After this leg, the weapons still had to pass through 
Pakistan to the different mujahideen commanders on the Afghan border and then on to 
soldiers on the battlefield (Ibid.).  Allegations of weapons being stolen or diverted on this 
journey were widespread, with estimates of the amount of aid that leaked out of the 
pipeline ranging from 20 to 85 percent of that donated (Goodson 2001, 144-145).  With 
the severity of weapons leaks uncertain, it is difficult to determine the impact they had on 
Afghanistan.  However, weapons leaks surely increased instability by generally 
improving access to advanced weaponry and ensuring that numerous factions within 
Afghanistan remained well armed.     
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Of course, the impact of U.S. funding to the mujahideen was not completely 
dictated by the decision to deliver aid through Pakistan.  Much of the lasting physical 
effects created by U.S. assistance were derived from the contributions U.S. funding made 
to the mujahideens’ ability to keep fighting the Soviets.  Instead of the easy victory the 
Soviets were expecting, U.S. aid made it possible for the war to go on for an entire 
decade.  Though this allowed the mujahideen to rid Afghanistan of Soviet occupation, it 
also deepened the wounds left by war.  Over the course of the war two million Afghans 
died, millions more were wounded and over half the population became refugees 
(Roberts 2003, 231).  In the period between 1978 and 1987 alone, 876, 825 unnatural 
deaths occurred in Afghanistan - an average death rate of over 240 deaths every day for 
ten years straight (Maley 2002, 154).  Despite the size of these figures, the number of 
refugees created by the war far eclipsed the number of people killed or injured by it.  
Since 1979 more than 6 million people have fled from Afghanistan, making Afghan 
refugees the largest single population of displaced people in the world (Johnson 2004, 
66). Despite the brutal destabilizing results of the Soviet-Afghan war, final U.S. funding 
did virtually nothing to help the situation and “little attempt was made to focus U.S. 
energy and aid either on creating the conditions and mechanisms for ensuring a relatively 
bloodless transfer of power to the Mujahideen, or in catering for the Afghans’ 
humanitarian needs during a transitional phase” (Saikal 2004, 205).  With no help in 
creating stability forthcoming and no single group among the mujahideen able to obtain 
enough support within Afghanistan to gain control of the government, the country 
descended into another decade of struggle.   
As struggle for control of the government continued in the 1990s, the bulk of the 
Afghan population endeavored to return their lives to normal.  However, the lingering 
effects of the Soviet-Afghan war made this feat impossible.  When the refugee population 
began its slow migration back into Afghanistan they discovered a civil war in progress 
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that continued to displace many people within the country.  Families trying to escape the 
fighting left their homes, drastically changing the traditional distribution of Afghanistan’s 
population.  In addition to changing traditional population distribution, the refugee crisis 
has diminished human capital formation, helping increase the potential for a cycle of 
conflict because “it is often easier to train unskilled youths to fight than to farm” (Maley 
2002, 155).   
The refugee crisis is not the only lingering effect of the struggle between the 
Soviets and the mujahideen.  Afghanistan also continues to cope with the weapons that 
remain on its soil as a result of the war.  Recent estimates put the number of Stinger 
missiles still unaccounted for in the country somewhere between 50 and 70 (Katzman 
2004, 37) and land mines are a prevalent and dangerous feature of the country’s 
topography.  Each month between 150 and 300 people are killed or injured by the 5 to 7 
million landmines still left on Afghan soil (Johnson 2004, 38).  Though the United States 
military support of the mujahideen succeeded in ending the Soviet threat to Afghanistan, 
it also ensured the Afghan population would continue to be threatened by the legacy of 




Through its funding of the mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war, the United 
States “created both a generation of Afghan and foreign born fighters with 
extensive combat experience and an atmosphere of activism and radicalism 
which was initially directed at the USSR, but whose wrath would later be 
broadened to include the West in general” (Lansford 2003, 5). 
 
The United States attitude towards Afghanistan immediately following World 
War II was one of aloofness.  For many years the United States ignored Afghanistan’s 
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frequent requests for military and development assistance.  On the few occasions the 
United States agreed to give aid to the Afghan government, these packages were 
accompanied by a number of extreme stipulations including astronomical interest rates 
and policy agreements that reflected little knowledge of Afghanistan’s needs or the power 
dynamics in South Asia.  Despite the requirements that accompanied agreements for the 
donation of aid to Afghanistan, the United States remained primarily uninterested in 
Afghanistan’s government and policies from 1946 to 1979.  During this time, the United 
States’ disregard for Afghanistan not only limited its development options, it also forced 
the country to turn to the Soviets for help.  Increased aid from the Soviets soon led to 
Afghan dependence on the country and increased political power for communist 
movements within Afghan politics.  However, even this growing connection eluded the 
United States until the Soviets began to prepare for invasion of Afghanistan.    
With invasion looming on the horizon, the United States jumped into action by 
throwing its support behind the mujahideen resistance.  However, the United States’ 
complete lack of knowledge concerning the true issues facing Afghanistan once again led 
to the encouragement of incredibly negative policies.  Rather than becoming actively 
involved in the distribution of funds to the mujahideen, the United States allowed 
Pakistan to determine which factions would receive the largest sums of American aid.  
The requirements Pakistan used to distribute aid to the mujahideen ensured that Islamic 
fundamentalism within Afghanistan grew while no single faction of the mujahideen 
developed enough strength to present a viable alternative to the communist government 
after Soviet withdrawal.  As a result, the removal of Soviet troops in 1989 left both a 
weak communist government in Kabul and a fragmented opposition in the rural areas of 
the country.  Instead of encouraging the growth of an alternative government, U.S. 
assistance to the mujahideen simply discredited the Soviets and ensured continued 
 Kersey 35 
fighting among the mujahideen would continue to devastate the Afghan population 
throughout the 1990s. 
Though the United States refused to give aid to Afghanistan, this did not mean the 
United States completely ignored the country.  In 1946, the Morrison-Knudson company 
began the Helmand River Valley Project, which the United States government would 
later help support.  However, support for the Helmand River project was not only offered 
at high interest rates, but also instead of funding for other development goals with which 
the Afghan government approached the United States (Roberts 2003, 166).  In addition to 
ignoring requests for broad development goals while offering loans for projects 
undertaken by American companies, the United States also responded to Afghan 
entreaties for a stronger relationship between the two nations with a four-year trade 
agreement beginning in 1950.  However, much like loans given for the Helmand River 
Valley Project, this trade agreement did not denote trust or interest in the Afghan 
government’s policies.  This fact was made abundantly clear when, one year after making 
the agreement, the United States suspended it until the Afghan government signed a 
bilateral Mutual Security Act (Clements 2003, 291).   
Though much of the United States’ interaction with Afghanistan seemed to be 
dictated by its fears of the Soviet relationship with the South Asian country, the true 
driving force behind the United States’ relationship with the country was a complete lack 
of knowledge.  Despite the fact that leaders in Afghanistan were ready to begin 
modernizing and would have gladly stood with the U.S. against the Soviets in the event 
of Soviet invasion, the United States remained “convinced that extensive involvement in 
Afghanistan would merely provide the Soviets with a pretext for action while 
overburdening the Afghan budget” (Roberts 2003, 186).  Due to these unfounded fears, 
the United States refused to make the type of alliance Afghanistan sought, pushing the 
country to deepen its relationship with the Soviets.   
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Despite its fears that increased aid would encourage Soviet action in Afghanistan, 
the United States did give aid to the country.  However, to say the US government 
remained extremely uninvolved in Afghanistan and had little working knowledge of the 
effects its policies had would be an understatement.  In fact, US observation of 
Afghanistan was so lax that the United States continued to fund the Afghan government 
after the Saur Revolution because no CIA operatives or intelligence officials were aware 
the new leaders the revolution brought to power were, in fact, communists (Lansford 
2003, 119).  Despite this snafu, the United States recovered from their error in judgment 
quickly and by 1980 had begun a program of wholehearted military support for the 
mujahideen resistance groups fighting the PDPA.   
Though the United States began supporting the mujahideen resistance groups in 
the 1980s, its knowledge of the inner workings of Afghan politics remained minimal.  
Instead of giving money and weapons to the mujahideen directly, the United States chose 
to distribute funding through Pakistan.  As a result, once weapons and money were turned 
over to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Service, the United States became 
blissfully unconcerned with the path aid took to reach the mujahideen.  This made the ISI 
completely responsible for determining distribution policies for United States aid.  
Despite the United States trust of Pakistan and Pakistan’s long-standing alliance with the 
United States, the country did not consider U.S. interests when selecting the factions of 
the mujahideen that would receive aid.  Instead, Pakistan’s ISI distributed the most aid to 
mujahideen groups with ‘weak links to the local society, educated commanders, and 
ideological proximity to the ISI’ (Maley 2002, 75).  These criterion not only accentuated 
the tensions between mujahideen groups (Ibid.), they also ensured mujahideen factions 
that practiced a more extremist fundamental version of Islam received more aid (Rubin 
1995, 35).  In this way, radical practitioners of Islam prospered while moderates were 
slowly pushed out of the spectrum.  Because the ISI required all refugees to be affiliated 
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with one of the many mujahideen groups in order to receive assistance, their distribution 
of U.S. funding not only impacted the version of Islam practiced by the mujahideen, it 
also impacted the version practiced by Afghan refugees (Clement 2003, 121).  As a result 
of their forced affiliation with one of the mujahideen factions selected by the ISI, the 
refugees’ exposure to radical versions of Islam increased.  This not only encouraged the 
spread of these interpretations through gradual indoctrination but also through forced 
acceptance.   
Despite the negative effects aid distribution through Pakistan created, the United 
States continued sending assistance to the mujahideen through the country.  However, 
extensive aid for the mujahideen did not completely rid Afghanistan of communism.  
When the Soviet soldiers withdrew in 1989 they left a communist government in control 
of Kabul.  Soon both the United States and the USSR lessened aid contributions to 
Afghanistan until they ceased completely in 1992.  Though continued aid flows from the 
United States and the USSR no longer affected Afghanistan’s political scene, the effects 
of aid distribution during the conflict remained.  Soviet aid allowed the remnants of the 
PDPA to maintain some control over Afghanistan even after Soviet withdrawal, but this 
control was lost in 1990 when the country descended into all out civil war.  Soon the 
various factions of the mujahideen and the government in exile all began fighting the 
communist government for power over the country.  Though the mujahideen forces 
finally gained control of the Afghan government in 1992, the aid distribution policies 
Pakistan had enacted during the Soviet-Afghan war ensured no single group had enough 
power to gain the support of the Afghan population.  Consequently, fighting continued 
throughout Afghanistan for the next decade, exacerbating the negative effects extended 
warfare in the country had already created.   
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Blinded by fear, blindsided by reality 
 
Afghanistan is doubtless the most fanatic, hostile country in the world 
today…  There is no pretense of according Christians equal rights with 
Moslems.  There are no banks in Afghanistan…[The Afghans] detest 
taxation and military service and welcome chaos and confusion which 
enables them to do…as they see fit on helpless communities and passing 
caravans…No foreign lives in the country can be protected and no foreign 
interests guaranteed. - Wallace Smith Murray, Chief of the State 
Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs in 1930 (Roberts 2003, 161) 
 
As Wallace Smith Murray’s vivid description of Afghanistan demonstrates, early 
images of the country held by the United States were less than flattering.  Afghanistan 
was not only seen as a lawless land but also as a country that would quickly fall under 
Soviet domination.  This view of Afghanistan greatly impacted the United States’ foreign 
assistance policy to South Asia following World War II.  Motivated by fear of what 
might happen if the United States agreed to aid Afghanistan or encouraged it to 
participate in a regional security alliance, the United States ignored the country during the 
early post-World War II period.  In fact, Afghanistan was completely omitted from 
foreign policy plans in South Asia.  Unfortunately, the view of Afghanistan as a 
barbarous state ripe for Soviet infiltration failed to incorporate a number of crucial facts 
about the country including Afghanistan’s history of opposition to the Russians and 
communism, the Afghan government’s desire to modernize and maintain friendship with 
the United States, and the country’s prime location within South Asia.  Ignoring these key 
facts in favor of maintaining old prejudices about Afghanistan caused the United States to 
remain preoccupied with security threats it perceived Afghanistan posed to South Asia 
and prevented it from seeing the security threat its own aid policies were creating.  As a 
result, the United States was blindsided by real security threats, such as the Soviet 
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invasion of Afghanistan and the growth of Al’Qaeda, which arose as a result of its own 
aid policies in Afghanistan. 
The first fact the United States ignored about Afghanistan was the country’s long 
history of opposition to the Russians.  This opposition found its roots in traditional 
struggles for independence from the larger country, but was reborn in new forms during 
the 20th century.  In the 1930s Afghanistan’s ruling dynasty “restricted Soviet activities in 
Afghanistan, banned all communist and communist-affiliated parties, and persecuted 
known sympathizers” (Roberts 2003, 185).    Afghanistan also “kept Soviet diplomats 
under constant surveillance and even prohibited communist embassies from distributing 
materials in any language native to Afghanistan, thereby insulating the population from 
propaganda” (Ibid., 186).  Even when the United States’ refusals of aid forced 
Afghanistan to turn towards the Soviets for support, the Afghan government made a 
conscious effort to minimize the influence the Soviets gained over the country by 
assigning Soviet-trained officers to less sensitive posts (Ibid., 209).  Afghan leaders also 
tried to counter Soviet influence by maintaining ties with a number of other great powers 
(Saikal 2004, 124).  These ties were meant to ensure the government would not be 
completely reliant on the Soviets, their equipment or Soviet-trained Afghans sympathetic 
to their cause. 
Due to its position as the Soviet Union’s main rival,  the most crucial of the other 
great powers the Afghan government attempted to maintain ties with was the United 
States.  Through out the post-World War II era the Afghan government demonstrated an 
intense desire for friendship with the US.  In fact, the country continued to court U.S. aid 
and approval year after year despite the cool response it received from the United States.  
Afghan interest in bettering relations with the United States was not only a result of 
efforts to balance out the influence of the Soviets, it also originated from a true desire to 
modernize the country.  As the most underdeveloped nation in South Asia (Roberts 2003, 
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184), Afghanistan saw foreign assistance as the key to development (Saikal 2004, 121).  
The country also viewed a strong alliance with the United States and the internal 
development this alliance would surely bring, as a solution to the threat increased reliance 
on the Soviets would pose.  
Some American officials also saw an alliance between Afghanistan and the 
United States as an appropriate measure to curtail Soviet influence in the region.  These 
South Asian experts within the State Department put forth the argument that the 
“successful defense of the subcontinent would require joint action by Pakistan, India and 
Afghanistan” (Roberts 2003, 136).  Despite the presence of this viewpoint within the 
State Department, Afghanistan remained absent from the United States’ plans to 
encourage the growth of collective security pacts in the region.  Instead of choosing 
Afghanistan, which was ideally located to shield the United States’ other major allies in 
the region, Pakistan and Iran, from Soviet invasion, the United States chose to fund Syria, 
Turkey, and Iraq (Ibid., 149).  To add insult to injury, the United States attached no 
strategic importance to Afghanistan and routinely dismissed the country’s concerns as 
inconsequential (Ibid., 155). 
Though Afghanistan never gave up its efforts to garner U.S. support, the 
continuous negative response it received from the United States led the country to feel 
increasingly isolated from the West.  The United States’ fear that Afghanistan would 
become a pawn of the Soviet Union would soon be realized, not because of a growing 
desire in Afghanistan to ally with the Soviets but because of Afghanistan’s growing 
alienation from the West (Ibid., 193).  This alienation forced Afghanistan’s leader, 
Mohammed Daoud, to choose “between continued economic stagnation, military 
impotence, and political frustration or rapprochement with the Soviet Union” (Roberts 
2003, 194).  In this way, “Washington’s spurning of Daoud entailed serious 
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consequences, leading eventually to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan more than two 
decades later” (Saikal 2004, 122). 
It took the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the United States to interpret events 
in the country as important to U.S. national security and containment policy.  However, 
the United States awareness that politics in Afghanistan could alter the security of South 
Asia only lasted as long as the Soviet-Afghan war.  By 1992, Afghanistan was once again 
forgotten by the United States and suffering through a wrenching combination of post-
war turmoil and civil war.  It was during this time period that new threats to the United 
States’ national security emerged as a result of the United States’ policies during the 
Soviet-Afghan War.  These threats took the form of terrorist Osama bin Laden and the 
group Al’Qaeda, which he controlled.  Bin Laden was one of the Arab fighters who had 
come to Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet conflict to fight in the jihad.  As a result 
of his opposition to the Soviets, Bin Laden benefited from US weapons and other military 
aid provided to the mujahideen in the 1980s.  However, when the jihad against the 
Soviets ended, Bin Laden, like many other Arab soldiers who had come to fight in 
Afghanistan, set his sights on other battles.   
Though he was similar in motive and past experience to many other Muslim 
Arabs who fought in Afghanistan, Bin Laden was also a man apart.  Instead of 
accompanying other former mujahideen soldiers to Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt or 
Somalia to continue the jihad, Bin Laden chose to create and maintain his own network 
of veteran mujahideen.  Though international pressure forced him to remain mobile 
during the early 1990s, by May 1996 Bin Laden had returned his base of operations to 
Afghanistan.  Here, in a country that was both forgotten and neglected by the United 
States and still in the final stages of civil war, Bin Laden was able to prepare a network of 
operatives who would dedicate their lives to wreaking havoc on the non-Muslim world 
by any means possible (Shay 2002, 138-139).  The rise of the Taliban government in 
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Afghanistan provided Bin Laden with an important ally and ensured Afghanistan would 
remain his base of operations through the rest of the 1990s.  With a safe haven 
established, Bin Laden began inciting violent activity in 1998 by calling on all Muslims 
to kill United States citizens and their allies.  Attempts to make good on these threats 
quickly followed with the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 
1998.  As a result of these attacks, the United States bombed Bin Laden’s training camps 
near Khost with cruise missiles (Clement 2003, 320).   
Though the bombings of US embassies in Africa garnered an immediate reaction, 
they did not facilitate the creation of policy to address the threat Osama Bin Laden, 
Al’Qaeda, and the Taliban posed.  Rather, they began a long and useless battle of words 
with the Taliban over the presence of Bin Laden and other Al’Qaeda operatives within 
Afghanistan.  The bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in October 2000, 
which the US also suspected Bin Laden and Al’Qaeda masterminded, brought with it 
another effort from the United States’ government to force the Taliban to extradite Bin 
Laden.  However, these efforts once again fell short and Bin Laden remained free. 
Despite the amazing amount of money the United States and the Soviet Union 
pumped into Afghanistan in the second half of the 20th century, Afghanistan remains one 
of the poorest countries in the world.  It is impossible to ignore the contribution that US 
and Soviet intervention in the 1980s made to the current issues Afghanistan is struggling 
against.  The instability and conflict the country suffered during the Soviet occupation 
and the subsequent years of civil war demolished any positive effects that could have 
been gained from US and Soviet aid prior to the conflict.  Years of war killed, injured, or 
uprooted much of the Afghan population, inundated the country with weapons and 
landmines, and radicalized and fragmented political groups.   
The attitude the United States approached Afghanistan with also had a major 
impact on the outcome of events in the country.  Instead of truly examining the power 
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relationship within South Asia and making educated aid policy decisions based on facts, 
the United States allowed an outdated image of Afghanistan and fear of perceived 
security threats to influence their foreign policy.  As a result, the United States succeeded 
in creating the situation it desperately hoped to avoid: a Soviet invasion of South Asia.   
Despite the obvious lessons the United States could have learned from its own 
mistakes, the end of the Soviet-Afghan war also ended U.S. interest in aiding 
Afghanistan.  The United States remained relatively unconcerned with events taking 
place in Afghanistan as the mujahideen failed to create a stable government and the 
country dissolved into civil war.  The lack of stability in Afghanistan, the emergence of a 
strong Muslim fundamentalist movement and the prevalence of weapons in the region all 
contributed to the conditions that allowed Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network to 
grow in Afghanistan.  These factors not only created a new, and very real, security threat 
they also emerged from aid policy decisions the United States made based on the 
perceived security threat the Afghan government posed.  The United States’ 
misinterpretation of politics in South Asia led it to make aid policy choices that both 
encouraged Soviet invasion and created a spirit of radical Muslim fundamentalism.  The 
growth of Al’Qaeda in Afghanistan and the country’s decent into civil war at the close of 
the 20th century were just the beginning of the effects Afghanistan and the United States 
would be forced to contend with as a result of United States foreign aid policy in the 
second half of the 20th century. 
 
U.S. foreign assistance policy in Nicaragua 
A brief history 
 
 Compared to the history of the United States’ relations with Afghanistan, the 
history of US relations with Nicaragua is quite long and complex.  From the time the 
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country’s Spanish colonizers departed Nicaragua in the 1820s, the United States stepped 
in to fill the void left by the colonial power.  The United States arbitrated disputes 
between warring political factions, invested in the economy, and agreed to protect 
Nicaragua from other powers.  When political upheaval began in earnest in the early 
1900s, the United States sent Marines to keep peace in the country.  As a result of the 
Marines’ occupation and Nicaragua’s dependence on U.S. support, U.S. troops remained 
the only military presence in Nicaragua for much of the early 1900s.  However, lessening 
support from citizens of the United States for maintaining a military presence in 
Nicaragua led the Marines to begin making plans for their departure.  Central to these 
plans was the creation and training of a new Nicaraguan national army, the National 
Guard, that would take over the job of maintaining peace in the country following 
national elections and the withdrawal of the Marines in 1933. 
 Unfortunately, three years after the Marines’ departure, U.S. hopes that the 
National Guard would help maintain a stable democratically elected government in 
Nicaragua were dashed when Anastasio Somoza Garciá, the commander-in-chief of the 
military, used the armed forces to take over the Nicaraguan government.  By the end of 
1936, Somoza had run for the presidency unopposed and changed the Nicaraguan 
constitution to lengthen his presidential term until May 1947.  In addition to changing the 
constitution, Somoza took other steps to ensure his power over Nicaragua was secure.   
The first was to ensure his control over Nicaragua was comprehensive.  In order 
to accomplish this feat, Somoza made personal investments in all sectors of the 
Nicaraguan economy and took control of the judicial system, radio, telegraph, postal 
service, health services, railroad and internal revenue service.  This control not only gave 
him the ability to pull strings in the economy, but also to determine the outcome of legal 
events and even how news in Nicaragua was reported.  Though Somoza had gained 
control of many sectors of Nicaragua, he still required some semblance of legitimacy to 
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gain true control over the Nicaraguan people.  In order to gain this legitimacy, Somoza 
insinuated his regime received the backing of the U.S. government.  This tactic, which 
the Somoza regime would continue to use to its advantage for the duration of its rule, 
played on the faith the Nicaraguan people had in the judgments made by the U.S. 
government.   
Despite Somoza’s indications otherwise, no real approval for the dictator had 
been given by the United States.  In fact, by 1950 the United States had begun to 
encourage the dictator to allow elections to take place in Nicaragua.  Though elections 
did occur, Somoza made efforts to subvert them to maintain his position of power and 
when these efforts failed, he forcibly regained control of the country.  In addition to the 
plotting Somoza facilitated to regain power in his own country in the 1950s, he also 
facilitated plots to overthrow the Costa Rican government.  By the time he was 
assassinated in 1956, the United States was no longer recognizing the Nicaraguan 
government.   
Anastasio Somoza’s assassination by no means brought the Somoza era to an end 
in Nicaragua.  Instead, it simply transformed the military dictatorship into a military 
dynasty.  Upon their father’s death, Somoza’s two sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, began running the country together.  The brothers each 
ascended to a position of power with Luis occupying the presidency while Anastasio took 
over as the commander-in-chief of the National Guard.  As president, Luis Somoza 
Debayle restored many civil liberties and the constitutional ban on reelection.  Luis’s 
time in office brought hopes of change in Nicaragua, but health issues prevented him 
from maintaining his position of power.  From 1963 to 1967 trusted friends of the 
Somoza family assumed the presidency in Luis’s stead, maintaining many of the positive 
changes he had enacted during his own time in office.  However, these changes would 
not last.   
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In 1967, Luis suffered a fatal heart attack and Anastasio used his position as 
commander-in-chief of the National Guard to gain the presidency.  Anastasio was a much 
more corrupt and brutal ruler than both his father and his older brother.  He abandoned 
the movements towards political freedom his brother had begun and often resorted to 
using force to maintain his position of power.  In 1971 Anastasio Somoza Debayle forced 
the Nicaraguan congress to dissolve itself and the constitution, effectively giving the 
dictator complete control over the country.  The new dictator also did his best to profit 
from the control he gained over Nicaragua.  When an earthquake devastated the country 
in 1972, destroying most of Managua and leaving thousands homeless and jobless, 
Somoza Debayle placed international humanitarian aid given to the Nicaraguan 
government for earthquake relief into his own private bank accounts.   
In the next six years of his rule, Somoza Debayle continued to make decisions 
that fueled the growth of opposition against him.  After winning a landslide victory in a 
clearly rigged election in 1974, Anastasio declared a state of siege in Nicaragua.  During 
this state of siege, Somoza Debayle instituted full censorship of the press and sent the 
National Guard on a campaign to squash opposition groups throughout the country 
(Walker 1985, 23).  Between January 1975 and January 1978 the National Guard killed 
an estimated 3,000 persons (Gómez 2003, 162).  Though the continued violence against 
the Nicaraguan people was intended to end their support for the opposition it had the 
opposite effect.  By 1978 many opposition groups had begun to band together in an effort 
to make change.  The traditional conservative party of Nicaragua, and four other groups 
opposed to the Somoza dictatorship: Udel, Los Doce, the Movimiento Democrático 
Nicaragüenese, and the Unión Democrática de Liberación, joined to form the Frente 
Amplio de Oposición (FAO) and began an effort to negotiate with Anastasio.   
While the FAO attempted to negotiate, violence continued.  The National Guard 
attempted to retake cities lost to rebel control and even went so far as to bomb major 
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civilian centers in October, leaving some 25,000 people homeless (Ibid.).  By the end of 
1978 the Nicaraguan people were tired of waiting for changes in their government and 
continued efforts by the FAO to negotiate for Somoza Debayle’s resignation were going 
nowhere.  With Anastasio insisting on remaining in power until 1981, more and more 
Nicaraguans began turning towards the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN 
or Sandinistas) for answers.   
Founded in 1961 by a group of highly nationalistic student activists who were 
morally repelled by Somoza and troubled by social conditions in Nicaragua, the 
Sandinistas had advocated violent revolution from the beginning (Walker 1985, 5).  
During the 1960s their guerilla forces were repeatedly destroyed, but this did not prevent 
them from winning crucial victories against Somoza Debayle in the 1970s.  These 
victories were won through successful hostage-ransom situations in 1974 and 1978 in 
which the Sandinistas were able to force Somoza Debayle to free political prisoners, give 
them money, and allow them to make announcements about their cause through the 
Nicaraguan media.  By 1978, with negotiations between the FAO and Somoza Debayle 
stagnating, the FSLN, their successes against Somoza Debayle, and their growing 
military strength became an attractive solution to removing the dictator from power.  By 
1979 support for the FSLN from other opposition groups had increased as had weapons 
flows from Venezuela, Panama, Cuba, and Costa Rica.  With this increased internal and 
external support, the Sandinistas stepped up their efforts to wrest control of Nicaragua 
from Somoza Debayle and were finally successful.  By the middle of 1979 Anastasio Jr. 
was isolated to Managua and a five-member junta had begun meeting in Costa Rica to 
make plans for a new Nicaraguan government. 
On July 17, 1979, Anastasio Somoza Debayle resigned and the five-member junta 
took over the government of Nicaragua.  Though the new government brought the hope 
of change and betterment, improving Nicaragua would not be an easy task.  During the 
 Kersey 48 
battle between Somoza Debayle and the Sandinistas, Nicaragua had lost two percent of 
its population (Ibid., 22).  In addition to this loss of life, the new government also 
inherited a debt of US$1.6 billion, 120,000 exiles, and 600,000 homeless (Merrill 1994, 
38).  Exacerbating the economic and social issues facing the junta were political issues.  
Early agreements made in Costa Rica began to falter once the junta actually came to 
power.  Though the group had previously agreed to a mixed economy, political pluralism, 
a non-aligned foreign policy, and a new non-partisan army not all of these conditions 
were met.  Over the next few years, representation within the junta dwindled as members 
resigned and FSLN leaders gained more control of the government (Ibid., 38).  The 
Sandinistas’ forces, which were the only strong military group other than the National 
Guard, split to become Nicaragua’s new military and police force, the Sandinista 
People’s Army (EPS) and the Sandinista Police.  By the mid-1980s, the EPS had become 
the biggest and best-equipped army in Central America and the international community 
had begun to take notice (Ibid., 41). 
The United States’ interest in the Sandinistas originated during the Carter 
administration and intensified under Reagan.  Though Carter encouraged moderate forces 
to negotiate with Somoza Debayle to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power, once the 
FSLN forces claimed victory over the dictator, the president attempted to maintain 
diplomatic relations with the new government.  However, Carter’s efforts were 
unsuccessful, and by the time Reagan gained office in 1981, relations between the United 
States and the FSLN had cooled considerably.  Reagan not only accelerated this trend, he 
made removing the Sandinistas from power his primary goal in Nicaragua.   To this end, 
Reagan began a campaign to isolate the FSLN and create a revolutionary force within 
Nicaragua to oppose them.   
The force the United States helped create, fund, and train became known as the 
contrarevolucionarios, or contras, and the war between them and the FSLN lasted 
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throughout the 1980s.  U.S. funding of the contras was a controversial issue in both 
Nicaragua and the United States from the beginning.  While the FSLN and the 
Nicaraguan people dealt with the contras origin in remnants of the National Guard and 
the destruction they caused with their brutal tactics, citizens of the United States 
questioned the morality of U.S. foreign policy and members of Congress squabbled over 
the appropriate steps to be taken to remove the Sandinistas from power.  By 1984 support 
for aiding the contras was so low in the United States that Congress passed the Boland 
amendment prohibiting funding to the contras from December 1984 to October 1985 
(Robinson 1992, 29).  Despite this amendment, the Reagan administration authorized the 
CIA to continue contingency funding to the contras throughout the 11 months it was 
made illegal.  Complicating the matter further, much of the money used to finance the 
contras during these months was derived from arms sales to Iran.   
The decision to continue funding the contras while the Boland amendment was in 
effect created a firestorm for the Reagan administration that came to be known as the 
Iran-contra scandal.  In addition to the scandal raging in the United States, there was 
another controversy related to US behavior in Nicaragua brewing on the international 
scene.  In March 1984, the CIA and the Navy helped mine Nicaragua’s harbors and in 
April the Pentagon sent more than 35,000 troops to international waters off the coast of 
Nicaragua to stage military training maneuvers.  With seven ships damaged by mines and 
their sovereignty clearly violated, the Nicaraguan government appealed to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for help.  Though the ICJ sided with the Nicaraguan 
government and insisted the United States stop both the mining and the support of the 
contras, this ruling was ignored (Norsworthy 1990, 213-214).  The United States’ 
decision to ignore Nicaragua’s sovereignty, the ICJ and international law led to 
considerable outrage from international actors and its own citizens. 
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Though scandals damaged the reputation of the United States, the Reagan 
administration, and the contras, the United States continued to give the contras non-lethal 
funding for the remainder of the 1980s.  Non-lethal aid helped keep the contras alive, but 
without military aid the Sandinista People’s Army was able to limit the rebels’ 
destruction to certain areas of Nicaragua.  With the contra threat under some semblance 
of control, the Sandinistas began their journey on the road towards peace.   
In 1987, with help from President Arias of Costa Rica, Nicaragua made peace 
with other Central American countries in a treaty that came to be known as Esquipulas II.  
The treaty, which was signed by Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua, called for national reconciliation, an end to external aid, and democratic 
reforms leading to free elections in Nicaragua (Merrill 1993, 48).  The Sandinistas 
adhered to the agreements made in Esquipulas II.  Soon after signing they began 
negotiations with the contras and agreed to hold elections in 1990.  The United States, 
seeing a new opportunity to ensure the Sandinistas were removed from power, helped 
strengthen and fund the opposition party.  The United States’ efforts were successful.  
The 1990 election welcomed Violeta Barrios Chamorro to power in Nicaragua and began 
a decade of attempted reconstruction for Nicaragua.  With their victory over the FSLN 
finally won, the United States’ special interest in Nicaragua continued only long enough 
to ensure the new government was securely in place.   
 
Failures in economic funding 
 
Despite its role as one of the top recipients of United States funding in Central 
America during the 20th century, Nicaragua entered the 21st century as one of the northern 
hemisphere’s poorest countries.  Fifty percent of the population lives below the poverty 
line, the country has an estimated $5.833 billion in external debt, and the unemployment 
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rate sits at 22 percent while underemployment is still considerable (CIA, “Nicaragua” 
2005).  Economic growth is a slow 1.5 to 2.5 percent annual GDP growth rate, much too 
low to meet the country’s needs (Ibid.) and though the Nicaraguan government has made 
great strides to combat the corruption within it, Nicaragua’s political system remains 
fragile.   
Many factors, such as years of colonization, unrest in neighboring countries, and a 
history full of violence and corruption, have contributed to the creation of Nicaragua’s 
current situation but few of these factors did their damage under the guise of doing good.  
In contrast, US economic support to the country has always been touted as a gift to aid 
economic growth.  However, fluctuations in this aid have played a key role in creating 
and exacerbating instability in the Nicaraguan economy.  US dollars have long had a 
substantial impact on Nicaragua.  In the early 1900s private investors from the United 
States helped begin the development of Nicaraguan businesses and from 1911 until 1959 
the U.S. government participated in a customs receivership with Nicaragua (Norsworthy 
1990, 211).  During the final years of this relationship, growth in the Nicaraguan 
economy was above par for the region.  Between 1950 and 1960 Nicaragua saw a GDP 
growth rate of 6.1 percent per year, the second largest in Central America and well above 
the 4 to 5 percent per year experienced in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Conroy 
1985, 228).  Nicaragua’s economic growth continued into the next decade, with 
aggregate growth averaging 9.8 percent per year from 1961 to 1968 (Ibid.).  Though 
Nicaragua’s economy showed impressive growth in the early years of the Somoza 
regime, this growth did not necessarily indicate the country had gained economic 
independence from the United States.  In fact, Nicaragua still depended heavily on US 
support to fund the workings of its government, with AID’s funds providing as much as 
15 percent of the government’s budget throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Norsworthy 
1990, 161).  
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Though the Somoza government still depended heavily on US economic aid to 
function, it could by no means count on these aid flows to be consistent.  Graph 3.A 
shows the flows of aid from the United States to Nicaragua from 1946 to 2001.  Clearly, 
aid flows between 1946 and 1979, when the Somozas controlled Nicaragua, were erratic, 
with consistency only emerging towards the end of their rule.  Rather than corresponding 
with decreases in Nicaraguan dependence on foreign aid or economic and social 
development in the country, economic aid flows to Nicaragua corresponded with the 
United States’ need for cooperation from the Somozas.   Marked increases in economic 
aid took place when the Nicaraguan government agreed to cooperate militarily with the 
United States to further US interests in Central America in the 1960s.  After Luis Somoza 
Debayle allowed the Cuban exile brigade to use military bases on the Caribbean coast of 
Nicaragua during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, economic aid from the United 
States to Nicaragua jumped from $9.9 million in 1961 to $13.7 million in 1962 (Merrill 
1993, 29).  Similarly, major drops in economic aid corresponded with the United States 
disapproval of actions taken by the dictatorship.  Frequently, this disapproval occurred 
when the Somoza family’s actions became overtly authoritarian.  For example, the drop 
in aid from $13.2 million in 1971 to $4.2 million in 1972 followed Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle’s efforts to gain complete control over the Nicaraguan government by forcing 
the Nicaraguan congress to dissolve itself and the Nicaraguan constitution in 1971.   
Fluctuations in economic aid also corresponded with the United States fears of 
losing a strong ally in Central America.  As the United States became more aware of the 
opposition facing the Somoza regime in the last half of the 1970s, the Somozas became 
the leading recipient of AID funds in Central America (Norsworthy 1990, 161).  Most aid 
was explicitly designed to reward the government for remaining Washington’s strongest 
ally in Latin America or to support the business elite. (Ibid., 161-162).  However, aid also 
increased when events in Nicaragua seemed to be escalating too quickly for the Somozas 
 Kersey 53 
to handle.  The largest jump in aid during the Somoza years, from $15.5 million to $42.2 
million came in 1975, the year after the Sandinistas successfully captured a number of 
leading Nicaraguan officials and Somoza relatives.  With these hostages, the Sandinistas 
were able to negotiate $1 million in ransom, the release of 14 Sandinista prisoners, and a 
government declaration read over the radio and printed in Nicaragua’s major newspaper 
(Merrill 1993, 32).  With their allies humiliated in the face of their rivals, it follows that 
the United States would support the Somozas in whatever way possible.   
The trend of increasing economic aid in time with the increase of unrest in the 
Nicaraguan population continued as opposition to the Somoza regime gained strength.  
Figures from USAID show a significant and consistent increase in funds to Nicaragua 
beginning in 1977, when Anastasio Somoza Debayle lifted martial law in the country 
(Norsworthy 1990, 212).  This move, which gave the illusion of loosening authoritarian 
rule, came at a time when the United States had begun to pressure the regime to increase 
its awareness of human rights. Somoza Debayle’s decision allowed the United States to 
increase funding while seeming to stick to its guns about its commitment to human rights.    
Though the United States continued to distribute economic funding to the 
Somozas, little effort was made to ensure this funding was used to further development in 
Nicaragua.  Despite the increase of aid in the 1970s, life for most citizens of the country 
remained difficult.  Nicaraguans faced a life expectancy of 53 years, half the population 
was illiterate, and thirty percent of the country’s income went to the richest 5 percent of 
income earners (Gilbert 1988, 3).  The devastating affects of earthquakes hitting the 
country in 1972 also greatly impacted the country.  Though international aid donors 
acknowledged this impact, the Nicaraguan people never benefited from their generosity.  
Instead, Anastasio Somoza Debayle absorbed the humanitarian aid for his own personal 
profit.   
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Though the United States had continued to give economic aid to the Somoza 
dictatorship even when this aid was clearly used by the dictators to increase their profit 
and their control over Nicaragua, economic aid was quickly stopped when the Sandinistas 
came to power.  After a brief and shaky alliance between the Carter administration and 
the FSLN, Reagan entered office with the intention of not only ceasing U.S. economic 
aid to the Sandinistas but also isolating them from other channels of economic assistance.  
This plan started with the suspension of all U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan government on 
January 23, 1981(Merrill 1993, 42).  Between 1981 and 1984 the Reagan administration 
also successfully blocked $400 million in loans and credits approved as bilateral and 
multilateral aid to Nicaragua (Norsworthy 1990, 164).  The loss of this money hit the 
country much harder than the loss of bilateral U.S. assistance, as it was earmarked for 
projects that would help the Sandinistas reach their goal of creating a robust economy 
that could meet the basic needs of its population. 
The suspension of U.S. economic aid to the Nicaraguan government lasted 
throughout the 1980s while the United States supported the contra forces fighting against 
the FSLN.  Without economic aid from the United States and other donors the U.S. 
influenced, the Sandinistas lost crucial economic support for much needed reforms and 
development projects in Nicaragua.  However, this loss of funds soon became the least of 
the Sandinistas worries as fighting in Nicaragua forced them to allocate more and more of 
their spending towards defense.  Defense spending continued to be a top priority for the 
Sandinista government right up to their loss in the 1990 elections.  The victory of Violeta 
Barrios Chamorro brought an end to Sandinista rule.  With a candidate it had supported in 
power, the United States ended its efforts to prevent Nicaragua from receiving economic 
aid.   
Chamorro’s victory not only ushered in an end to U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua 
from international aid donors, it also brought about a few years of intense U.S. efforts to 
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fund Nicaraguan development.  During the 1990s, the amount of aid Nicaragua received 
from the United States was much larger than any decade before.  This trend of increased 
funding began as soon as Chamorro entered office with the largest donation to date, 
$224.5 million.  Though monetary amounts fell considerably in 1992 from the $219 
million delivered in 1991 to $76 million, funding spiked again in 1993.  Though the 
Chamorro government received more economic aid from the United States than any 
Nicaraguan government before, this aid did not translate directly into development.  In 
order to receive U.S. funds, Nicaragua was forced to meet a number of requirements.  
These requirements for the receipt of aid funding made post-war recovery arduous.  The 
percentage of the Nicaraguan population in poverty increased and from 1991 to 93 GDP 
growth was negative (Haugaard 1997).  Though the United States made initial efforts to 
support Chamorro, with the Sandinistas out of power and the Cold War over Nicaragua 
could “no longer be construed as a national-security threat which needed to be confronted 
with all of America’s diplomatic, military, economic, and private resources (Norsworthy 
1990, 153).”  Despite Nicaragua’s continued economic plight and their continuing efforts 
to recover from a decade of war, funding from the United States fell consistently in the 
mid-90s and then resumed its previous pattern of fluctuation: a dramatic spike in funding 
arriving every three or four years only to be followed by downturns for the following 
year.   
 
Military funding: the contra cop-out 
Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, argued, “the contras were a 
‘cop-out’ providing the illusion of solving the problem while escalating the 
level of violence” (Ruttan 1996, 312). 
 
  United States military aid to Nicaragua in the second half of the 20th century is 
marked by two key periods.  These periods are separated not only by the nature of U.S. 
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military aid, but also by the nature of the government controlling Nicaragua as they 
unfolded.  The first of these periods took place while the Somoza dictators ruled 
Nicaragua.  It was characterized by fluctuations in military aid to the Somoza regime 
based on threats facing the United States and a nearly complete lack of attention to the 
abuses the Somoza regime regularly perpetrated.  Though efforts to link military aid to 
human rights improvements did occur, this transpired just a few years before the 
Somozas were ousted and the Sandinista forces took control of the Nicaraguan 
government.  This transfer of control was the catalyst for the second period of U.S. 
military funding in Nicaragua, which took place throughout the 1980s.  During this 
period, the United States gave substantial amounts of covert aid to the contras to help 
create, train, and fund the opposition group.  Like funds transferred to the Somozas, 
military funds given to the contras were donated without regard to the tactics the contras 
employed or the impact continued war had on Nicaragua. 
Clearly, despite the changes in the Nicaraguan government and the way the 
United States aided the Nicaraguan military, one factor was constant: the United States 
disregarded the needs of the Nicaraguan people when making decisions about military aid 
donations.  Instead of being influenced by the intense corruption of the Somoza regime 
military aid during the first period was motivated by security threats, both real and 
perceived, to the United States.  These threats took precedent over the Somoza regime’s 
efforts to use the military to gain complete control over Nicaragua, including the media, 
economy and legal system, and their willingness to commit gross human rights violations 
to gain this control.   
Despite the obvious ideological issues presented by distributing military aid to the 
Somozas, as long as the dictators agreed to cooperate with the United States’ military 
interests, military aid continued to flow into Nicaragua.  Figure 3 shows the amount of 
official military aid Nicaragua received from the United States each year from 1946 to 
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2002.  Though none of these numbers are very high, they demonstrate the connection 
between US foreign policy interests and aid fluctuations.  For example, the Eisenhower 
administration delivered military aid to Somoza in return for Somoza’s agreement to 
allow the CIA to train Guatemalan rebel forces in Nicaragua (Pastor 2002, 25).  Of 
course, the Somozas’ support also came in handy when real security threats arose.  
During the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Luis Somoza Debayle gained US recognition 
and increased military aid by condemning communism and allowing the Cuban 
government in exile to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion from Nicaragua.  This increased 
support saw fruition the following year as military aid from the United States to 
Nicaragua almost quadrupled (see Figure 3). 
During the 1970s, the last decade of the first period of U.S. military aid to 
Nicaragua after World War II, military aid to Nicaragua from the United States was, 
much like economic aid, designed to help the Somozas maintain power or to ensure a US 
friendly government would succeed the dictators.  To this end, military aid funds paid for 
the training of National Guard officers and for a counterinsurgency program (Norsworthy 
162).  However, unlike economic aid, military aid to Nicaragua stopped in 1978 due to 
the Somoza government’s failure to improve human rights conditions.  Though the 
Reagan administration would abide by President Carter’s decisions to end official 
military aid to Nicaragua, military funding from the United States continued to flow into 
Nicaragua throughout the 1980s.  In this second period of funding, military aid went, not 
to the Nicaraguan government, but to the contra forces who opposed the Sandinista 
government.  Much like the decision to fund the Somozas, the United States’ decision to 
give military funding to the contras was motivated by a perceived national security threat 
in the form of the Sandinistas.  U.S. money was used to create, train, and fund the 
contras, who in turn launched a guerilla war on the FSLN government that lasted for 
years, creating countrywide devastation.       
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Though it is clear that the United States supported the contras throughout the 
1980s, definite figures on how much money was spent are difficult to determine.  Much 
of the aid to the contras was delivered through the CIA and deemed covert.  Other funds 
were funneled through US allies and still more were delivered illegally during 1985 and 
1986 as a result of arms deals in Iran.  Increasing the impossibility of discovering exact 
dollar amounts is the fact that much of the money requested by Reagan was requested as 
contingency funding.  This label meant the administration was not required to fully 
disclose where and how this money was being used, let alone how much was being used 
(Robinson 1992, 30). 
Despite all this confusion and uncertainty, sources tend to agree that the US gave 
$19 million in military aid to the contras during both 1981 and 1982 (Norsworthy 1990, 
176).  After this, figures diverge.  According to William I. Robinson, the amount allotted 
for the contras in 1983 was $33 million, but Kent Norsworthy contends the figure for 
capital sent to the contras in 1983 came to US$29 million (Ibid.).  Though many scholars 
have their own sets of figures for the funding the United States allocated to the contras 
during the 1980s, Norsworthy’s figures are both more frequently duplicated and more 
complete than other sources.  These figures, which can be examined in graph 3.C, 
demonstrate the consistent and extensive funding given to the contras by the United 
States from 1982 right up until 1990.   
Regardless of the exact amounts, U.S. funding helped the contras become an even 
more powerful, numerous, and better supplied fighting force than the National Guard had 
been under the Somozas.  By 1986, the contras even had their own incipient air force and 
navy (Ibid.).  Though the contras had forced the Sandinistas to spend an ever-increasing 
amount of the government budget on security and to call a state of siege within 
Nicaragua, by the late 1980s the EPS was able to limit the contras’ destruction to certain 
areas of the country.  Even with their destruction limited to specific areas, the contras still 
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managed to wreak havoc on Nicaragua.  Between 1980 and 1987, the contras had killed, 
kidnapped or injured 18,663 Nicaraguans (Gómez 2003, 168).  The large number of 
people killed is a small surprise considering the tactics the contras were trained by the 
United States to use against their enemies.  U.S. issued training manuals given to the 
contras listed “the selective assassination of civilian government officials, police, and 
military personnel” and the “public ‘neutralization’ of civilians believed to collaborate 
with the Nicaraguan Government” as model tactics (Ibid., 169).  The contras also targeted 
workers in social service sectors, such as education and medicine, to ensure fewer people 
in the Nicaraguan rural community received the government provided social services 
they had grown to expect in the early 1980s (Walker and Armony 2000, 76).   
In addition to encouraging brutal tactics, U.S. funding and training of the contras 
provided the contras with the ability to begin fighting and then to continue fighting for 
years on end (Orozco 2002, 67).  The importance of U.S. aid to sustaining the contras is 
clearly demonstrated by the effect of diminished U.S. aid to the group in the late-1980s.  
By this time, the lack of true contra victories over the FSLN and the Iran-contra scandal 
had caused the public in the United States to almost completely lose support for aiding 
the contras.  As a result, the government voted to curtail military aid to the contras in 
1987.  As aid from the United States dwindled, it forced a stalemate in the fighting in 
Nicaragua and soon led to the beginning of negotiations between the contras and the 
Sandinistas.   
When the fighting finally stopped, Nicaragua had been devastated.  Estimates on 
the total monetary cost of the contra war on Nicaragua hover around $2.5 billion, two 
years worth of Nicaragua’s GNP in 1994.  In addition to the monetary cost, Nicaragua 
contended with an estimated death toll of 35,000 (Ibid., 103).  Along with the physical 
destruction continued war created, there were also social implications.  After years of 
fighting for political change that would bring freedom, development, and stability in their 
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country, the Nicaraguan people were left with a culture that found the solutions to its 
political problems on the battlefield (Ibid.).  This culture of violence greatly impacted all 
of the Nicaraguan people, but its impact was especially strong on the youth and the elite 
(Ibid., 102).  With the contra war over, former soldiers were left without jobs and 
Nicaraguan soon found itself with “tens of thousands of young men – with little training 
or experience in anything except violence – [in] the streets” (Walker and Armony 2000, 
79).  
Though the Nicaraguan government under Chamorro agreed to pardon the rebels 
and offered them land and resettlement benefits (Gómez 2003, 174), reintegrating the 
demobilized fighting force into Nicaraguan society proved difficult (Walker and Armony 
2000, 79).  Tensions between ex-contra rebels and other Nicaraguans continued even 
after the end of the war and despite Chamorro’s valiant efforts to encourage peace and 
reconciliation in the country.  By the end of 1990, civil unrest ensued and as early as 
1992 re-Contra forces began to emerge (Gómez 2003, 175).  These forces, which were 
likely made up of ex-contra rebels, used the same violent tactics the contras had resorted 
to in land disputes against farmers across the Nicaraguan countryside (Ibid.).  Former 
members of the Sandinista military (Recompas) also took part in the renewed guerilla 
activity and looting and even bands made up of a mixture of both former contra and 
former Sandinista forces (Revueltos) joined the fighting (Walker and Armony 2000, 79).  
The continued presence of these gangs throughout the 1990s demonstrated that simply 
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Reversing the revolution 
 
“In Central America, for example, the involvement and participation in 
domestic affairs by the CIA and the U.S. in the name of democracy 
strengthened the institutions that were causing repression and 
authoritarianism in the region (Orozco 2002, 109).” 
 
The United States has always had a major influence in the way Nicaragua is 
governed.  In its early history, Nicaragua often looked to the United States for help and 
guidance in affairs of state.  Though the United States’ active control of policy decisions 
in Nicaragua ended in the 1930s, its opinion remained a powerful force in the outcome of 
political events.  Through out their dictatorship, the Somoza family capitalized on the 
United States’ new hands-off policy towards Nicaragua and the respect the Nicaraguan 
people had for the United States by implying their government had US support.  
Uninterested in actively supporting the authoritarian dictator but still leery of 
encouraging the forces that opposed him for fear of creating a security threat, the United 
States refrained from making clear and consistent statements of support for or opposition 
to the regime.  However, increasing human rights violations and the possibility that a pro-
communist government would come to power in Nicaragua caused the United States to 
once again take an interest in the country.  This interest lasted through out the Reagan 
presidency, which devoted a considerable amount of funds and attention to changing the 
natural course of events the popular revolution led by the Sandinistas had put in motion.   
The United States influence on Nicaraguan politics in the latter half of the 20th 
century produced incredibly negative results.  Reagan’s support of the contras created 
nearly a decade of violent warfare that forced the Nicaraguan government to reallocate 
funds from social services to defense spending and left the Nicaraguan people, 
countryside, and economy in ruins.  Even after the contra war ended, the United States 
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continued to use military and economic aid to influence Nicaraguan politics.  Both during 
the 1990 election and the years that followed, money from the United States greatly 
influenced political and economic decisions, complicating the processes of reconciliation 
and reconstruction in Nicaragua.   
The United States’ post-World War II involvement in Nicaraguan politics did not 
begin immediately.  Though the United States cooperated with the Central American 
nation in a few military alliances and continued to provide aid packages, the period 
directly following World War II saw much less involvement from the superpower in the 
decisions made by Nicaragua’s government.  Interests in events transpiring elsewhere in 
the globe and continued military cooperation and anti-communist rhetoric from the 
Somoza dictatorship, caused the US to overlook the ideological issues presented by 
recognizing the regime.  During the Nixon presidency, the United States even went so far 
as to support Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s bid for the presidency in the 1974 elections 
(Ruttan 1996, 331).   
However, this whole-hearted support was short-lived as conditions in Nicaragua 
worsened after Somoza Debayle’s reelection.  Between January 1975 and January 1978, 
the National Guard killed an estimated 3,000 persons in an effort to preserve the Somoza 
dictatorship (Gómez 2003, 162).   Though the United States long turned a blind eye to the 
Somozas’ corruption, growing opposition to the Somoza regime in the late 1970s on the 
world stage and in Nicaragua and increased human rights abuses in the wake of rebel 
activity in the country led President Carter to change American policy towards the 
regime.     
Though the Carter administration expressed support for the end of the Somoza era 
in Nicaragua, the United States was not ready to allow the opposition groups led by the 
FSLN to overthrow Somoza Debayle.  Rather than allowing the revolution to take place 
on its own or aiding the popular FSLN in their inevitable victory over Somoza Debayle, 
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the United States began to channel funding to a number of other groups within Nicaragua 
in the hopes that these groups would gain enough strength to control the Nicaraguan 
government once Somoza Debayle was ousted.  Despite the abuses they perpetrated, the 
National Guard was first on the list of foreign aid recipients.  The United States also 
funded moderate and conservative groups that opposed Somoza Debayle, in the hopes 
that these groups would be able to successfully negotiate with the dictator (Ruttan 1996, 
307).  Unfortunately for the United States, negotiations between Somoza Debayle and 
moderate groups quickly deteriorated despite threats that this deterioration would lead to 
the termination of US military aid programs to Nicaragua and ensure that no new aid 
projects for the country would be created (Ibid., 308).   
While the United States busied itself with attempting to create a peaceful transfer 
of power, Somoza Debayle continued to use violence and the National Guard to maintain 
his control of Nicaragua.  Protests and requests for the dictator’s resignation led to 
harsher treatment of the opposition by the National Guard and in October 1978 the 
government began bombing civilian centers, leaving some 25,000 persons homeless 
(Gómez 2003, 162).  The dictator’s actions added more fuel to the fire of Nicaraguan 
opposition and on July 17, 1979 the Sandinistas were finally able to take Managua.   
Though the United States saw the Sandinistas and their Marxist revolutionary 
ideology as a threat, once the group came to power President Carter tried to work with 
them to make changes in Nicaragua.  Carter’s willingness to work with the Sandinistas 
was by no means absolute.  While negotiating with the FSLN, Carter also channeled the 
bulk of US aid to Nicaragua through private organizations and the rightwing business 
sector to avoid sending US funds to the FSLN-led government (Norsworthy 1990, 162).  
As negotiations between the US and the Sandinistas faltered, the already weak 
relationship between the Carter administration and the FSLN cooled as Carter’s 
presidency drew to a close.  The fizzling of this relationship set the stage for President 
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Reagan’s intense opposition to the FSLN and the radical lengths he would go to to oust 
them. 
The new president saw US support of anti-communist insurgent groups as the key 
to the United States’ ideological battle against the Soviets and to maintaining US national 
security.  Four years before commenting that Nicaragua represented “an unusual and 
extraordinary security threat to the national security and foreign policy in the United 
States” in 1985(Lamperti 1988, 25), Reagan had begun using covert funding and training 
to create a revolutionary army to fight the Sandinistas.  Reagan also suspended all U.S. 
aid to the Nicaraguan government on January 23, 1981 and began a campaign to use all 
of the United States’ considerable influence with international lending institutions and aid 
donors to stop other foreign funding from reaching the FSLN government.  Between 
1981 and 1984 the Reagan administration managed to block $400 million in loans and 
credits approved as bilateral and multilateral aid to Nicaragua (Norsworthy 1990, 164).  
The loss of this money hit the country much harder than the loss of bilateral U.S. 
assistance, as it was earmarked for projects that would help the Sandinistas reach their 
goal of creating a robust economy that could meet the basic needs of its population.  As 
funds diminished, so did the social programs the Sandinistas had been able to provide in 
the early 1980s.  The disappearance of these programs did their fair share in turning the 
rural population of Nicaragua against the Sandinistas.   
However, Washington’s battle against the Sandinistas was much more complex 
than simply isolating the new government from international funding.  While the Reagan 
administration blocked aid to the FSLN, it also used money and a number of other tactics 
to aid groups in Nicaragua who opposed them.  The U.S. embassy in Managua had an 
employee assigned to religious affairs who, according to an August 1986 Washington 
Post report, “cultivates and organizes protestant religious resistance to the Nicaraguan 
government and keeps track of the activity of church figures who favor the government 
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(Ibid., 165).”  Through this unique employee, the U.S. was able to ensure aid funds were 
going to religious groups that opposed the Sandinistas.   
Despite the Untied States’ efforts to drum up support for groups that opposed the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the U.S. was never able to help the contras gain the confidence 
of the Nicaraguan people.  Though some peasants from the North and ethnic groups from 
the Caribbean coast were members of the contra groups, the contras military members 
were predominantly ex-members of Somoza’s National Guard (Gilbert 1988, 165).    
These soldiers were associated with Somoza, his sons and the years of military 
dictatorship they had used the National Guard to maintain, a factor that prevented them 
from receiving support from the Nicaraguan people.  Another factor that prevented the 
contras from receiving support from the Nicaraguan people was their corruption.  
According to reports from the General Accounting Office, more than half of the $12 
million given to the contras for humanitarian reasons, including the purchase of supplies, 
went, instead, to Miami bank accounts for contra leaders (Coerver 1999, 168). 
Despite the obvious lack of support for the contras from the Nicaraguan 
population, intense funding and encouragement from the United States to the contras 
continued well into 1987.  This support kept the contras from negotiating with the 
Sandinistas, leading to years of low intensity warfare.  Continuing conflict forced the 
FSLN government to continue to divert funds from social programs to defense spending, 
deeply hindering efforts the Nicaraguan government was making to rebuild after years of 
corrupt rule.  In 1985 60% of Nicaragua’s national budget, 40% of its material output and 
25% of the GNP went towards defense efforts (Robinson 1992, 36).  This contrasted 
greatly to the early years of the revolution when 50% of the national budget was directed 
towards education and health (Gómez 2003, 170).   
Luckily for Nicaragua, lack of support in Washington and the promise of a new 
election finally brought an end to aid flows from the U.S. to the contras.  Attempts to win 
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a military victory in Nicaragua had clearly failed, and the U.S. saw the 1990 election as a 
new opportunity to remove the Sandinistas from power.  As the United States began 
directing funds to the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO), the fourteen party opposition 
group to the Sandinistas, instead of the contras, a military stalemate between the contras 
and the Sandinistas was finally reached and negotiations for peace began.   
  As the battle between the Sandinistas and the contras came to an end, the 
political battle between the Sandinistas and the UNO was initiated.  Though the UNO 
was the largest group opposing the FSLN, it was also still relatively weak.  The 
Sandinistas were better organized in their campaigning and were able to use some 
government resources to their advantage (Merrill 1993, 49).  In order to counteract this 
advantage and increase the likelihood of a UNO victory in the 1990 election, newly 
elected President George H. W. Bush requested $9 million in direct campaign aid to the 
UNO (Robinson 1992, 60).  Rather than clearing this sort of direct funding, Congress 
okayed the delivery of money to Nicaragua that would strengthen infrastructure and 
institutions.  
With direct funding denied, the Bush administration began funding the UNO and 
their candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, through the CIA, the National Endowment 
for Democracy, and other government groups.  Through these groups the United States 
spent a total of $30 million on Nicaragua’s national elections (Ibid.).  Efforts to support 
the UNO also came through other U.S. channels.  In January 1990, just one month before 
the election in Nicaragua, President Bush sent letters to the chairmen of the Democratic 
and Republican parties requesting direct cash donations be made to the UNO.  This 
request was followed by a similar one extended to European and Asian governments by 
Secretary of State James Baker (Ibid., 294).  The result was an influx of tactical advice 
and tens of millions of dollars in covert and overt aid to any parties or politicians who 
would join the UNO (Walker and Armony 2000, 77). 
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When the election results were tabulated in February 1990, they demonstrated the 
strength of U.S. influence.  Despite occupying a consistent second place in the polls taken 
prior to the election, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro had won 55% of the vote to FSLN 
candidate Daniel Ortega’s 41% (Merrill 1993, 50).  Chamorro’s victory ushered in a few 
years of intense U.S. efforts to fund Nicaraguan development in an attempt to ensure the 
continued popular support for the U.S. friendly government (Haugaard 1997).  However, 
this funding was dependent upon Chamorro’s adherence to a number of economic 
policies suggested by the United States, the World Bank and the IMF.  These policies not 
only made reconciliation difficult, they also increased the poverty rate in Nicaragua.  
Despite the damage caused by the policies they created, the United States quickly lost 
interest in Nicaragua.  With the Sandinista threat removed, the Cold War winding down, 
and a government beholden to the United States in power, the need to meddle in 
Nicaraguan domestic policy dwindled and the United States stepped back to watch the 
events it set in motion run their course. 
 
Discovering the real security threat 
 
The war in Nicaragua was a dispute over the meaning of democracy and 
democratization in Nicaragua.  One side believed that democracy is an 
exercise of sovereignty and self-determination that lies exclusively in the 
hands of the citizenry while the other saw democracy from the United States 
perspective, as content and process, as universal suffrage, freedom of the 
market, and anti-Communism (Orozco 2002, 55). 
 
From the outset, the FSLN coming to power in Nicaragua was perceived by the 
United States as a national security threat.  This perception originated before the 
Sandinistas came to power and escalated steadily until members of the Reagan 
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administration would go so far as to break the law to continue to support opposition 
forces in Nicaragua.  Reagan claimed “Nicaragua was participating in ‘aggressive 
activities’ and had allied itself with the Soviet Union in the East-West conflict” (Lamperti 
1988, 25), even though there was little evidence to support these claims.  A leading 
historian on Nicaragua, Thomas W. Walker explains though the members of the FSLN 
did adhere to Marxist ideologies, “this simply meant that they – like an increasing 
number of Third World intellectuals – saw economics as a major determinant of social 
and political matters, believed in the reality of class struggle, identified imperialism as a 
major problem for the Third World, saw military and educational establishments as 
inherently political, and so on.  The acceptance of these ideas did not mean they believed 
in the possibility of creating Marx’s communist utopia in Nicaragua (Walker 1985, 23).”  
In fact, when the FSLN ousted Somoza Debayle in 1979, it was working as a broad-based 
national movement concerned primarily with ridding Nicaragua of the Somoza regime 
and rebuilding the country.   
Though the Sandinistas shared the origin of their belief system with the Soviets, 
their connection to the superpower was not as strong as Reagan indicated.  On the 
contrary, the members of the FSLN had long tried to remain out of Moscow’s sphere of 
influence.  These efforts began with the creation of the FSLN, which originally formed as 
an alternative to the Soviet-sponsored Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN).  The 
founders of the FSLN decided to create their own organization because they believed the 
PSN was too closely linked to Moscow (Walker and Armony 2000, 71).  Over time the 
Sandinistas became even further removed from the PSN and the Soviets.  It grew from 
the original student group to include other members of Nicaraguan society and also made 
alliances with Christian based communities through the Catholic clergy, which helped 
broaden the movement’s appeal even further (Ibid.).   
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By the time the FSLN took control of Managua, it was allied with a number of 
other opposition groups in Nicaragua and received the backing of the Nicaraguan people 
as well as that of many other Latin American nations.   These other Latin American 
countries, such as Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica (Lamperti 
1988, 26), not the Soviet Union, gave the Sandinistas much of the economic, military and 
political support necessary to finally overthrow Somoza Debayle.  While the Sandinistas 
did receive aid contributions from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, these 
contributions made up less than a quarter of the aid the government received from 1979 
to 1984 (Ibid., 28). 
Though Reagan claimed the problems in El Salvador and Nicaragua were the 
USSR’s effort to destabilize Central America (Ruttan 1996, 311), Moscow was quite 
surprised by the changes taking place in Nicaragua at the beginning of the 1980s because 
the Moscow-line socialist party in Nicaragua had reported the country was not yet ready 
for revolution (Lamperti 1988, 26).  Regardless of this surprise, many news reports 
appeared in Nicaragua and the United States throughout the 1980s which seemed to 
support the Reagan administration’s claims that Nicaragua was a “safe house, a command 
post for international terror” (Coerver 1999, 150).  Though they appeared in many 
reputable news sources, many articles began as government “leaks”, which were actually 
completely fabricated (Walker and Armony 2000, 75).  The propaganda mill for the 
contra war also churned in the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  Shut down in December 1987 for engaging in prohibited activities, the office 
had engaged in covert propaganda such as planting articles favorable to the contras in the 
U.S. press and illegal lobbying (Coerver 1999, 164).   
Though much of the threat posed by the Sandinistas was both exaggerated and 
fabricated, this did not stop the United States from using its economic and military aid 
policies to combat the perceived security threat.  United States aid policy in Nicaragua 
 Kersey 70 
during the Somoza regime set the precedent for the link between U.S. national security 
threats and aid fluctuation.  However, it did not prepare Nicaragua for the damage U.S. 
interference in the country would create in the 1980s.  Through use of economic and 
military aid, the United States was able to demolish the revolution it had taken the 
Sandinistas twenty years to build in less than ten.  With the perceived Sandinista threat 
removed, U.S. aid numbers reduced considerably and then resumed the irregular flow 
they had followed during the Somoza regime.  Unfortunately, Nicaragua could not boast 






Throughout the history of the United States foreign assistance program, the 
primary objective of foreign assistance policy has always been to improve the security of 
the United States.  This is demonstrated in the rhetoric used to discuss foreign assistance, 
the policies and institutions created to distribute aid, and the correspondence between 
historical events and changes in aid flow and allocation.  As the foreign assistance 
program evolved, policy makers altered the means used to ensure the attainment of the 
United States national security to include long-term programs geared towards increasing 
the prosperity of developing countries.  Despite the addition of this aspect of the program, 
the containment doctrine and the fear of “falling dominos”, not long-term development 
goals, were the main factors impacting foreign assistance funding.  This is evident in 
foreign assistance history and distribution, as represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, as 
well as in the history of foreign assistance to Afghanistan and Nicaragua outlined in parts 
three and four. 
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Though many aspects of the United States foreign assistance policy to these two 
countries differed, in both instances the United States’ fear of communist expansion and 
lack of knowledge concerning the true nature of the difficulty facing each country led it 
to incorrectly assess the nature of the security threats emanating from Afghanistan and 
Nicaragua.  In Afghanistan this meant the United States denied assistance to a 
government truly interested in committing to the United States’ vision of development 
and democratization, a decision that pushed Afghanistan towards increasing ties to the 
Soviet Union.  This decision eventually led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which 
began an over 22-year period of warfare, destruction and instability in the country.  At 
the end of this time period, any possible positive effects Afghanistan could have derived 
from spotty ineffective economic aid distributed by the United States before the Soviet-
Afghan War had been obliterated, social upheaval was widespread, weapons and 
landmines littered the country, and a terrorist network that would greatly impact the 
security of the world in the next century was growing.  Despite all this, when the United 
States believed the possibility of a communist threat was removed, foreign assistance was 
also withdrawn leaving Afghanistan to flounder unaided in instability and allowing a real 
security threat tot eh United States to grow.   
Though the situation in Nicaragua was less an issue of neglect and more an issue 
of unnecessary interference, the decisions the United States made based on faulty 
information concerning the severity of the communist threat led to consequences similar 
to those in Afghanistan.  After the United States supported years of brutal dictatorship in 
Nicaragua it falsely accused the popular revolutionary government that finally rid the 
country of this bane of working with the Soviet Union to spread communism.  Along 
with this unfounded accusation, the United States sent extensive support to a fringe 
insurgent movement, the contras, strengthening them enough to enable them to wreak 
havoc in Nicaragua for an entire decade.  When extensive covert and overt aid to the 
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contras failed to it bring about the changes in the Nicaraguan government the United 
States desired, the country used other forms of foreign assistance to ensure the election of 
their chosen presidential candidate.  When the election resulted in the establishment of a 
government devoid of any sort of connection to communism, whether authentic or 
superficial, the United States’ interest in Nicaragua waned leaving the nation to fight an 
uphill battle against the militarism, poverty, and corruption the United States had helped 
create without the benefit of U.S. foreign assistance funding.   
Though the study of the United States’ foreign assistance program and the 
security concerns of the nation during the cold war help illuminate the connection 
between support for foreign assistance and perceived security threats to the United States, 
it does nothing to illuminate the true effect the United States foreign assistance policies 
have on recipient nations.  Through examining the events taking place in Afghanistan and 
Nicaragua between 1947 and 2001 as a result of the foreign assistance decisions the 
United States has made in regard to these countries it is clear that the link between the 
United States foreign assistance policy and national security is incredibly detrimental to 
recipient nations.  In both Afghanistan and Nicaragua, foreign assistance from the United 
States was harmful in three ways: the lack of clear connection between aid flows and the 
issues facing aid recipients created dramatic fluctuations in aid giving which wreaked 
havoc on fragile economies; the proliferation of weapons and advanced military training 
in already turbulent situations increased their danger and helped create a culture of 
violence within recipient countries; and consistent undermining of existing governments 
or popular revolutions through US interference into the policies of each country stripped 
their governments of authority and autonomy.  In addition to revealing the incredibly 
negative effect the United States assistance distribution policies for Afghanistan and 
Nicaragua had on these countries, the study of the United States’ assistance program also 
reveals that many of the decisions the United States made between 1947 and 2001 were 
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based on unfounded fears of communist expansion and a poor understanding of the issues 
facing recipient countries.   
Figure 3
U.S. Covert Military Aid to Afghan Rebels during the 1980s
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